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Cover: Raiko's Retainers Playing Go. An oban triptych by Kuniyoshi. This print is based on the Raiko and the Ground Spider legend written about in *Go World* 63. The players are so engrossed in their game that the goblins seem no more than a trivial nuisance, hardly worse than those kibitzers in a go club who point out your mistakes.

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Go World News


News from Japan

Takemiya Becomes the Meijin Challenger

After leading the Meijin league from the start with five straight wins, Cho Chikun folded in the final stretch, losing his last three games and blowing his chance to challenge Kobayashi Koichi for the title.

Even though he was leading, every win was important because two determined players, Takemiya Masaki and O Rissei, were right behind him with only one loss each. But on June 15, O Rissei, a player who has done well against Cho recently, beat him to turn the league into a three-way tie between them and Takemiya. Then a month later, on July 19 after successfully defending his Honinbo title, Cho lost to Awaji Shuzo. Awaji has been Cho's nemesis in the Meijin league. In the last seven leagues, Awaji has beaten Cho six games and lost only once. With this record and the importance of this game for his becoming the Meijin challenger, the pressure may have been too much, for he lost by resignation.

Going into the final round, he still had a chance to become the challenger. All he had to do was beat Takemiya and hope that O Rissei would lose to Awaji, which he did. That would have necessitated a play-off between Cho and Takemiya, since they both would have had a 6-2 score. But, as it happened, Takemiya forced Cho to resign and won the right to challenge Kobayashi for the title.



Playing his patented cosmic style, Takemiya let Cho take all four corners while he built a huge moyo in the center (see diagram above). Then Cho made a modest intrusion into this moyo with Black 1, but, suddenly, he found his invading stones trapped in the center without eyes when Takemiya played White 12.

Takemiya was in a major slump last year, losing 22 games and winning only 11. At the beginning of the year he made a slight modification to his cosmic style and he started to achieve good results. His record so far this year is 25 wins to six losses.



Takemiya: happy to be the Meijin challenger

It will be interesting to see how Takemiya's new cosmic style fares against the pragmatic, territory-oriented go of Kobayashi. Such contrasting styles are sure to produce some exciting games.

The first game of the title match is scheduled to be played on September 6.

The final scores and rankings in this year's league are as follows:

1. Takemiya 7-1 (challenger)
2. O Rissei 6-2
3. Cho Chikun 5-3
4. Kato Masao 5-3
5. Kataoka Satoshi 4-4
6. Rin Kaiho 3-5
7. Awaji Shuzo 3-5 (dropped)
8. Yuki Satoshi 3-5 (dropped)
9. O Meien 0-8 (dropped)

In spite of his brilliant job of preventing two of the front runners, Cho Chikun and O Rissei, from becoming the challenger, Awaji Shuzo still got dropped and will have to win his way back into the next league.



Kobayashi Satoru: challenging for another title

Kobayashi Satoru Challenges Rin for the Gosei Title

By defeating Hisajima Kunio 9-dan in the final of the Gosei tournament on June 8, Kobayashi Satoru won the right to challenge Rin Kaiho for the Gosei title. This is his second major title match in this year.

The best-of-five match is now underway; Rin won the first game, but Kobayashi won the next two. Rin then won the fourth game, guaranteeing that the match would go the full distance. The fifth and final game will be played on August 23.

Late news: Kobayashi won the fifth game, and the Gosei title, by half a point

The 51st Honinbo League

The members of the 51st Honinbo league have now been decided. Four players have retained their places from the previous league. They are:

1. Kato Masao 9-dan
2. Yuki Satoshi 8-dan
3. O Rissei 9-dan
4. Yo Kagen 7-dan

Joining the league this year are Nakano Hironari 8-dan, Miyazawa Goro 9-dan, Ryu Shikun Tengen, and Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan.

Nakano is a promising 26-year-old player from the Central Japan Branch of the Nihon Ki-in.

Miyazawa is a veteran player who has never won a major title but is highly-regarded by other Nihon Ki-in professionals. He has won the Shinjin-O title and the 7-dan section of the Kisei tournament two times each. This is his second appearance in a league (he played in the 18th Meijin league).

Kataoka won his way back in immediately after dropping out of the previous league. In the final preliminary round, he defeated past Honinbo Rin Kaiho. Rin, who won the title or played in the league 29 time in a 30-year stretch, will therefore miss his second league in a row. We certainly hope to see him make a comeback in the future.

Of course, everyone will be watching the performance of Ryu Shikun. By winning the Tengen title last year, he has proven that he is a force to be reckoned with. He is young and still improving, so it wouldn't surprise anyone if he were to become the challenger.

It will be left to Kato to represent the older generation of players in this league.

The 43rd Oza Tournament

In the semifinals of the 43rd Oza tournament, O Rissei beat Yamashiro Hiroshi and Kobayashi Koichi beat Sonoda Yuichi of the Kansai Ki-in to reach the final round of this tournament. The winner of this game, to be played in September, will challenge Cho Chikun for the title.

No matter who becomes the challenger, a Kobayashi-Cho or an O-Cho match would attract a lot of attention. It had been expected that Cho would challenge Kobayashi for the Meijin title this year, but O helped put an end to that expectation by defeating Cho in their game in the league. Moreover, since O has done well recently against Cho, a confrontation between the two in a title match would be interesting.

The 20th Shinjin-O Tournament

Mimura Tomoyasu 7-dan, who won last year's Shinjin-O title (King of the New Stars), has reached the final round of this year's tournament. He will face Cho Sonjin 8-dan, a 25-year-old Korean player who makes his career in Japan and who also won this title in 1991 by defeating his compatriot Ryu Shikun.

The 20th Kisei Tournament

The first games in the final tournament to decide the challenger for the 20th Kisei title were played on August 24. Otake Hideo beat Yuki Satoshi 8-dan, Kato Masao beat Takemiya Masaki, and Kobayashi Koichi beat Hashimoto Yujiro 7-dan. These winners advance into the quarterfinals.

The first quarterfinal game will be played on September 7 between Honda Kunio 9-dan and Fukui Susumu 9-dan. Other games to be played later in the month are as follows: Cho Chikun vs. Otake, Kato vs. Ryu Shikun, and Kobayashi vs. So Kufuku 7-dan.

News from China

Ma Defends the 10th Tengen Title

For the second straight year, Nie Weiping challenged for the Chinese Tengen title. Last year he was soundly defeated 3-0 by Ma in this best-of-five title match. This year Nie managed to do a little better, winning one game against three losses.

Ma Defends the Kiwang Title

The 6th Kiwang (King of Go) title was decided in a best-of-five match from February to June. Ma Xiaochun defended his title against Zhang Wendong 9-dan with three wins against two losses.

Ma Wins the CCTV Cup

Ma Xiaochun beat Nie Weiping in the deciding game of the CCTV Cup, a television lightning go tournament. By reaching the final, both Ma and Nie earned the right to represent China in the TV Igo Asia Championship, an international TV tournament between China, Korea, and Japan.

NEC Sponsors a New Chinese Tournament

Japan Electric Corporation (NEC), in cooperation with the Chinese Weiqi Association, has established a new tournament called the China NEC Cup. This will be a lightning tournament with each player allowed 30 seconds a move with 10 minutes thinking time at the beginning of the game. The rules are similar to the Japanese version of this tournament. Twelve players

have been selected to take part in the first tournament. They are Nie Weiping 9-dan, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan, Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan, Cao Dayuan 9-dan, Yu Bin 9-dan, Zhang Wendong 9-dan, Shao Zhenzhong 8-dan, Wang Jianhong 8-dan, Zheng Hong 8-dan, Wu Shaoyi 8-dan, Wang Yuan 7-dan, and Luo Xihe 5-dan. The two games in the first round were played on May 6 in Beijing. Wu Shaoyi defeated Luo Xihe and Yu Bin beat Wang Yuan.

News from Korea

Lee Defends Three of His Titles

Lee Chang-ho defended his Kiwang (King of Go) title against Yoo Chang-hyeok. Lee won this best-of-five title match by a score of 3-1. He then defended the Chaigowi (Top Position) title 3-2 against Cho Hun-hyun and won the Baccus Cup for the third year in a row. His opponent here was also Cho Hun-hyun.

Yoo Defends the Wangwi Title

Yoo Chang-hyeok defended the Wangwi (King) title against the challenger Cho Hun-hyun. Cho, who used to hold most of the Korean titles, is still without a major title, having lost nearly all of them to his disciple Lee Chang-ho. Lee, who just turned 20, now holds 12 titles. This was a chance for Cho to get back one of the titles he lost to Lee back in 1990. The best-of-seven title match went the full distance, but in the last game, Yoo, playing White, won by 3 1/2 points.

Although Yoo holds only one other title (the Baccus Cup), he is now the number two player in Korea. However, Yoo has had successes in the international tournaments. He won the 1993 Fujitsu Cup, placed second in the 1994 cup, being defeated by his compatriot Cho Hun-hyun, and came in third in this year's cup, defeating Cho Chikun in the playoff.

International News

Ma Wins the Tong Yang Securities Cup

Although it is a Korean tournament, the best-of-five final of the 6th Tong Yang Securities Cup turned out to be an all-Chinese affair between Ma Xiaochun and Nie

Weiping. The last two games were played on May 22 and 24 in Seoul. Ma defeated Nie 3-1.

Although Ma is China's number-one player, holding five Chinese titles, he has not had much success on the international go circuit. This is the first international title he has won, and he now seems to be on a roll. He followed up this success by winning his second international title in a row, this year's Fujitsu Cup. (See report on page 33.) We should also mention that he has won both the China-Japan Meijin and Tengen matches. (See report on the China-Japan Tengen match on page 46.) With these wins, he has clearly demonstrated that he is now a force to be reckoned with in international go.

The 10th China-Japan Super Go Series

This year's China-Japan Super Go series is turning into a rout for the Japanese team, billed as the strongest ever. The series is far from over, but the young and promising Japanese players, from whom a better performance had been expected, have all been eliminated by one player, Chang Hao 7-dan.

In the first round, Hua Xueming defeated Kato Tomoko, Japan's Women's Meijin. Hua then lost to Mimura Tomoyasu, the holder of the Shinjin-O title. In the next round, Mimura fell to Chang, who went on to defeat Morita Michihiro 7-dan, a young player who has been doing very well in Japanese tournaments. (he faced Yoda in the playoff to decide the challenger for the Judan title this year). Chang then disposed of Ryu Shikun, the holder of the Tengen title, who has made a big splash on the Japanese tournament scene this year. In the 6th round, to be held in Tokyo in September, Chang will face Kobayashi Satoru Kisei.

With only Kobayashi, Rin Kaiho, and Otake Hideo as anchor, it seems that the Japanese team doesn't have much of a chance. China has yet to field its biggest guns. Even if Kobayashi defeats Chang, he or the two remaining members of his team will still have to face Yu Bin 9-dan, Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan, Ma Xiaochun and Nie Weiping. Both Kobayashi and Ma are in excellent form this year, but the same cannot be said for Rin and Otake, both of whom are 53 years old and past their prime. The best chance for the Japanese team would

be if Kobayashi could prevail and run up a string of victories against the remaining Chinese team members. If he could do this, it would prove that his winning of the Kisei title earlier this year was no fluke.

Ma Xiaochun: The Fujitsu Cup Champion

This year's Fujitsu Cup was won by China's Ma Xiaochun. From the first round to the last there were many surprising upsets. In the final game between Ma and Kobayashi Koichi, Kobayashi was leading, but he made a mistake on move 214 and lost by 7 1/2 points.

Nie Weiping was eliminated early on by the 1993 champion Yoo Chang-hyeok, Kobayashi Satoru disposed of last year's champion Cho Hun-hyun, and Kobayashi Koichi eliminated Korean boy-wonder Lee Chang-ho. Jimmy Cha, a Korean who now plays out of the USA, was summarily dispatched by another Korean, Jang Sooyoung, but in the next round Jang fell to Cho Chikun.

Two games from this tournament are commented on from page 33.

Obituary

Manfred Wimmer (1944-1995)

Manfred Wimmer, the first Westerner to break into the Japanese professional ranks, died of a stroke last spring. After winning the European Championship in 1969 and 1974, Wimmer came to Japan to seriously study go. He was accepted as a go apprentice at the Kansai Ki-in, where he made professional shodan in January 1978; the following year he earned promotion to 2-dan in the Oteai. Shortly thereafter, he retired and returned to Austria, where he started a travel agency. During the winter months, he resided in Africa, where the warm climate seems to have suited him. He played an important role in introducing go to the island of Madagascar.

Having relinquished his professional status, he was quite active on the European tournament scene right up to the time of his death. In spite of his bad health, he had quite good results, being the top-placed European-born player in last year's European Go Championship.

A Message to Our Readers

Over the last three months, many of our readers have asked about Kiseido, who we are, and why we are in the go-book publishing business. We would like to take this opportunity to introduce ourselves.

Kiseido Publishing Company was founded in 1982 by John Power and Richard Bozulich. Richard Bozulich is the founder of Ishi Press and John Power was the editor of *Go World* for its first 71 issues. Kiseido was established primarily to publish the book *Invincible: The Games of Shusaku*. Other books on famous great players had been planned, but because of John Power's busy schedule, which included the editing of *Go World*, these books were never realized. After the Shusaku book sold out in the late 1980's, Kiseido ceased doing business actively. For that reason, John Power and Richard Bozulich resigned as directors of the company; Kiseido continued to exist only on paper.

In May of 1995, Richard Bozulich revived Kiseido by infusing new capital into it with plans to start an intensive publishing effort of a new style of go book. In May 1995, John Power terminated the rights of Ishi Press to publish *Go World*, and these publishing rights were purchased by Kiseido. In addition, the rights to publish many of the other Ishi Press books are now held by Kiseido and they are to be reprinted under its imprint.

In June of 1995, in order to more effectively serve go players in North America, Kiseido was formed as a California corporation in San Rafael, California, by Bill Franke. From 1983 through 1994, Bill Franke lived and worked in Tokyo, where he learned to play go and was a proofreader for *Go World* and Ishi Press (Japan). Kiseido will market and distribute Kiseido Publishing Company's books, *Go World*, and a wide range of quality go equipment from Japan and Korea.

If you've been involved with go for a while, have been or are currently a subscriber to *Go World*, and have bought one or more Ishi Press books, you're probably wondering why Kiseido Publishing Company isn't distributing its books and *Go World* through

Ishi Press International, Ishi Press's American distributor since 1987. We would prefer not to engage in a public discussion of this issue, so we will simply repeat Richard Bozulich's statement in *Go World* 73 (p. 6): 'Because of serious differences I have been having with the other directors of Ishi Press International for the last year or so, I have terminated my relations with them and that organization.' Kiseido and Ishi Press International are currently discussing ways of reaching an amicable settlement, but we don't expect to arrive at one before the end of 1995.

Kiseido intends to honor your paid-up subscriptions to *Go World* even though we have not received and probably will not receive payment for them. However, as a consequence of this termination of relations, Kiseido does not have access to the *Go World* subscriber list. For this reason, we are forced to request that subscribers provide us with this information so that there will be a minimal delay in receiving the copies of *Go World* that you've paid for. We have advertised this information on the Internet in the rec.games.go newsgroup, in *The American Go Journal*, and in *Go World* itself. Now we are writing to all the go clubs on the AGA's 1994 list of go clubs in North America. If you know people who have paid for *Go World* subscriptions, but haven't as yet received issue 73, please tell them to contact Kiseido and give us their name, address, and the issue through which their paid-up subscription runs. If they don't know the number of the last issue to which they are entitled, they can contact Ishi Press International and find out that information.

We apologize for any delay and inconvenience this change of publisher and distributor has caused you, and we thank you for your patience, understanding, and cooperation.

Kiseido Publishing Company (Japan)
Kiseido (USA)

The 50th Honinbo Title Match



At a reception in Seoul before the first game: Cho Hun-hyun, Kato Masao, and Cho Chikun

As readers of this magazine are aware, over the last few months players from the younger generation have been grabbing titles held by the older generation. At the end of this year's Honinbo league, there was a strong possibility that another young player, 23-year-old Yuki Satoshi, would become the challenger. He ended the league tied with Kato Masao, a 48-year-old veteran of the Honinbo tournament, who himself became the youngest challenger ever in 1969 at the tender age of 22. Kato also held the Honinbo title for three consecutive terms from 1977 to 1979. In normal times, Kato would have been the odds-on favorite to defeat this young upstart, but with older players falling to younger ones, and the fact that Yuki had already beaten Kato in their league game, everyone expected to see another young player become the challenger for a major title. But it was not to be. In the play-off, held on April 20, Kato convincingly crushed Yuki in 177 moves to become the challenger.

Like most of the other top players in Japan today, Cho and Kato were disciples of Kitani Minoru. Kato is nine years older than Cho and he reached his peak in the late 1970's when he won 14 major titles in the space of four years.

Kato's reign as the dominant tournament player was followed by Cho's hegemony. In the early 80's, Cho won every one of the seven

major titles (the 'grand slam' of go), and held the top four titles — Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo, and Judan — simultaneously. He is the only player to have accomplished these two feats.

Before this title match, Cho and Kato had faced each other a total of 87 times, with Cho winning 53 of these encounters to Kato's 34. In the six title matches they have contested, each has won three.

However, their rivalry goes back even further. They were both live-in disciples of Kitani Minoru, and it is said that the person who most severely trained Cho was Kato himself. The number of games played between them in those days was in the hundreds. They changed handicaps with each game and at one point Kato forced Cho to a nine-stone handicap. Cho, with tears in his eyes, refused to give up and continued to challenge Kato.

In spite of his overall edge, Cho's fans were a bit worried because of his disastrous showing in the Kisei title match. However, Cho seemed to have recovered his old form, judging by his early success in the Meijin league. Cho's performance in the first game of this title match also seemed to indicate that he is back to his old winning form. He played steadily, taking the lead in the middle game and holding on to it without making a single mistake.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun, Honinbo and Oza

Black: Kato Masao 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on May 10–11, 1995, in Seoul, Korea.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1–20)

Figure 1 (1–20). Kato's favorite opening

Kato often plays on komoku (the 3–4 points), and whenever White plays 2, Kato immediately plays the *tasuki* fuseki with Black 3. The *tasuki* fuseki is an old fuseki, and Black 1 and 3 are very traditional moves.



Dia. 1


10: connects at 3

White's extension at 8 is tighter than White A. The meaning of White 8 is that if White

plays A, he would have to answer Black's invasion at B with White C. For that reason, White holds back with 8, even though Black's exchange of 13 for White 14 is good for Black.

Extending to White 1 in *Dia. 1* is also big, but Black would then pincer White at the top with 2. The sequence from White 3 to Black 14 could be expected and Black would be satisfied.

There are three moves on the sides left to be played, and Black 9 is the largest among them. After this, White takes the right side with 10 and 12, and Black gets the bottom side with 11.



Dia. 2

Instead of 10, if White played 1 in *Dia. 2*, the sequence to Black 6 would follow, giving Black good balance throughout the whole board. Cho did not like this result.


White 16 invites Black to play 17.

Figure 2 (21–44). Thickness or target

Black 21 is an interesting move. The one-space jump of Black 1 in *Dia. 3* is the usual move and it would also be good in this position. If White jumps to 2, Black caps the white group with 3. If White jumps to 3, then Black invades with 'a' and White responds at 'b'. If Black played 1 at 2, White could take territory with 'a', and Black would have to play towards the center; this would not be favorable for Black.

Black 23 causes an interesting skirmish, and the moves from 27 to 39 are inevitable. If White played 32 at 38, Black would not con-

nect at 24 with 33, but would play at A instead. This would have been a failure for White.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (21-44)
39: connects at 24

After White 40, there are two options, and it is extremely important for Kato to accurately predict the results when choosing between Black 41 and B. Kato stressed eyes and played 41 and 43, but he could just as well have played at B instead. I could be second guessing, but I think Black B is better, even though this black group would not have two eyes. Black 5 to 9 in *Dia. 4* is one possible variation.

Instead of playing 5, Black could also play elsewhere, but by playing 1 Black can aim at playing 'b' in the top left; this corner would

not become White's territory as in the game.

From this point on, whether this black group will become thickness or a target is the subtle theme of this game.



Dia. 4




Figure 3 (45-60)


Figure 3 (45-60). Long-considered responses

Instead of 49, Black could play 1 in *Dia. 5*. If White connects with 2, Black could capture the entire white group with 3, 5, and 7.


White 4 in *Dia. 6* is also possible. Black would then capture three white stones on the right. This would be an unhappy outcome for White. Because of these variations, White would not connect with 2 in *Dias. 5* and *6*; instead, he would play at 4.

With 52, White's shape is settled. It is my feeling that, in spite of this sharp skirmish,

Black has not gained much profit. Still, the result can be considered even.



After the game, Kato said that he should have played 53 directly without exchanging Black 51 for White 52, but I don't know whether or not that was right.



Black 53 was the sealed move. In response, White has two choices. One is White 54 and the other is White 55. Answering the attachment with 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 7* would not be good here. These moves only help Black; since the center is crucial in this game, Black would like to play towards the center. For that reason, playing 1 in *Dia. 8* is a viable option. The result of this would be to strengthen the center, thereby forestalling Black 'a' and other

moves Black is aiming at. White could even aim at the black group in the top center.

When Black cut with 55, Cho spent 100 minutes on his next move.





Figure 4 (56-82)


Figure 4 (56-82). White suddenly takes the lead.

Instead of 56, White could play 1 in *Dia. 9*. But Cho was not confident he could handle Black's powerful counterattack up to 10.



Kato thought about Black 57 for 47 minutes. The problem is that even though Black lives in the corner, this allows White to play the *geta* at 60 and to become thick and secure in the center. Thus, White is relieved. The question here is whether or not Black can play 1 in *Dia. 10*. The outcome of the game rests on

the answer. If White responds with 4, then Black plays 5 and 7, aiming at the white group on the right side. Black could attack with Black 'a', White 'b', and Black 'c', depriving White of eyes on the side.



Dia. 11

Cho being Cho might respond with 1 in Dia. 11. This variation ends with White 7. Locally, Black would lose three stones, but he has the forcing sequence of 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c'. With this in reserve, Black might attack aggressively at 8. The ensuing fight would be very difficult, but at least playing this way (attaching on the outside with 1 in Dia. 10) would be more like Kato's usual style. It may also have been what Cho was most afraid of. It's a great relief for White when Black just tries to live in the corner.

After Black defends the bottom with 65, White 66 is the vital point against the black group at the top. Black has no choice but to defend with 67. Even so, this whole group is still in danger. If White plays B, C, or D, it will be difficult for Black to find a proper response.

As a consequence, Black's position suddenly becomes thin throughout the board. This is because Black has let White become very thick on the bottom right. From this point on, White is moving ahead.

White begins to erase Black's moyo with 68, and Kato starts to make territory with 75 and 77. White 80 and 82 are to prevent Black from playing E. Without these moves, Black would play E and efficiently make territory.

The question now is whether Black will

answer White 82. If the white territory in the upper left is as big as Black's lower left, then Black will be in trouble, because the black and white territories on the right side are equal, and the komi puts White ahead.





Figure 5 (83-112)

Figure 5 (83-112). White solidifies his territory.

Kato plays a hane with 83 to repel White's 'demand' that Black obediently defend at 84. If Black played 83 at 84, White would play A; this could lead to a long drawn-out game.




Dia. 12 11: connects


White 86 was a calm and steady move. Playing 1 in Dia. 12 would invite a black attack at 12. This would be very scary for White. Since White is already ahead, he should not play in such a dangerous way. White 86 still

aimed at 1 in *Dia. 12*. To prevent it, Black 87 was necessary. But this allowed White to play 86 and 88. Cho must have been quite satisfied with this outcome. When White plays 88, Black has to strengthen his group on the top right with 89. But then White plays 90, a very big move, making the upper left corner completely White's territory, without need to protect against an invasion on the 3-3 point.

After exchanging 91 and 92, even if Black tried to live in the corner with 1 in *Dia. 13*, White would kill Black with 2 and 4. Instead of 1, Black 'a' would still allow White to kill this group with 4. Black 93 has nothing to do with Black 91; it is just an endgame move. It does not reduce White's territory there.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

The end result of this skirmish is that White's territory at the top left balances with Black's territory at the bottom left.

White 100 is a crucial move. Without it, a lot of *aji* would surface, and Black could cause problems if White played 1 in *Dia. 14*.

Black 107 is big, but being able to play a forcing move with 108 makes White feel very good. Without Black 109, White could capture two black stones around 84.

Figure 6 (113-165). Kato's endgame is too simple.

The endgame starts with White leading by a small margin. If Black answered White 14 and 16 with 34, White would play 18. In the game, White cuts with 20 and eventually

makes a ponnuki, so the situation turns out to be even clearer for White.






Figure 6 (113-165)

Black 21 is big because it prevents White from playing 1 in *Dia. 15*. White 3 would be a very good forcing move, and with 5 White would reduce Black's territory.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

Black 35 and White 36 are miai. If Black played 36, White would probably play A.

It has been said the endgame is Kato's forte, but Kato seems to be playing this one too simply. Black 47 and 49 are examples. After White 46, I wondered if Black could play

1 in *Dia. 16* as a forcing move. After the exchange of 1 and 2, Black still had a chance to play 'a'. Even at Black 51, Black still had a chance to play 1 in the same diagram. In addition, couldn't Black play B instead of 55? And play C instead of Black 59? These are all small points, but if Black tried to play them, the game would have been closer. Nonetheless, in this figure, there is no chance that Black could pull off an upset.

It was also a shame that Black did not try the adventurous moves in *Dias. 10* and *11*. Cho was probably most afraid of those moves. Kato must have read all variations and decided that they were unfavorable. But would they really have been unfavorable? I would like to confirm this with him.




Figure 7 (166–220)
86: retakes at 66

In conclusion, I should mention that Cho seems to have overcome his aberrant form during the Kisei title match. He made no strange moves in this game.

220 moves. White wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, July 1995. Translated by Kazunari Furuyama.)

Game Two

White: Kato Masao 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo Oza

Played on May 24–25, 1995, at the Ginrinso in Otaru, Hokkaido.

Commentary by Kato Masao.

'I want to play seven games.'

I have not played in a Honinbo title match since I lost this title fifteen years ago. I did play a seven-game title match against Cho 14 years ago when I challenged him for the Meijin title, but I lost the series four games in a row. Moreover, I lost the Oza title to him last year. So when it comes to title matches, I have been humiliated. It is about time to give him a good scare.

I think Cho was relieved not to have to face a young challenger. Because I am the challenger, he may think he can somehow win. Kobayashi Satoru, though he is not exactly young, Ryu Shikun, and Yoda Norimoto have each taken a title, so the veteran players are beginning to fear them. We of the older generation think we are still artistically superior, but young players often challenge us with games of great energy.

To be honest, I am not confident that I can defeat Cho, but I would like this match to go down to the wire so that I can at least play seven games. Fortunately, I won this second game, so, if I can maintain the momentum, I feel I might be able to attain my goal of playing seven games.





Figure 1 (1–22)

Figure 1 (1–22). Cho's new approach

White 10, in combination with 6 and 8, has been played frequently, but this is the first time I have played it. Its meaning is that simply playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* gives Black the


good checking extension of Black 4, which aims at 'a'. So as to deny Black this good move, White 10 was invented.




Dia. 1

Instead of 11, Black has other options, such as 12, 15, and 17.

First, if Black plays 1 in Dia. 2, White usually answers with 2 and 4. In this case, not only is a black checking move at 'a' overconcentrated, but White also can live in the corner with 'b'. This is very discouraging.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Second, if Black plays 1 in Dia. 3, White still plays 2 and 4. This leaves White with the exchange of 'a' for Black 'b'. Therefore, Black would be reluctant to play 'c'.

Finally, if Black draws back into the corner with 1 in Dia. 4, White will respond with 2 and

then make a wider extension than usual with 4. When Black extends to 5, White jumps to 6. White can later aim at the sequence 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'–Black 'd'–White 'e', so the exchange of White's attachment (White 10 in the figure), inducing Black 1, has become a good move for White.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 11 is the most frequently played answer to White 10 and White 12 is the correct response. Black 13 and 15 are new moves which Cho played to avoid the normal response. Usually Black answers White 12 with 1 through 7 in Dia. 5, and in this position White would play 8 and 10. This result is not necessarily good for White, for the white stones above may not become forcing moves but result in a heavy group which Black can later attack. For this reason, I felt grateful to Cho for playing 13 and 15, giving me a clear outcome where White could capture 13 in a ladder.

Figure 2 (23–44). An overplay by Black?

Cho's new move at 23 was probably played for the first time in Japan. I say 'in Japan' because I think a pro in South Korea has tried it before, but I might be mistaken.

I questioned Black 23. It is obviously a ladder-breaking move, but being able to escape with the threatened black stone would not necessarily lead to the devastation of the white stones on the upper right side, so if Black sustained too great a loss in the bottom left, such a loss might not be enough compen-

sation for White's damage on the right side. Even if Black got a chance to play A, White could play a shoulder hit above A to minimize the loss.





Figure 2 (23-44)

Black 1 in *Dia. 6* was the move I expected and I intended to respond with 2 to 6.




Dia. 6

Instead of White 28, I could play 1 in *Dia. 7*. Black breaks the ladder with 2 and 4, but White 9 re-establishes the ladder. If Black extends to 10, White launches an attack on the black group with 11. If Black connected at 7 with 4, White would capture at 6. However, White 28 appealed to me; I don't dislike playing a large-moyo game.


White 1 in *Dia. 8* might have been better. The sequence to White 9 could be expected.

This would also generate a favorable moyo for me.




Dia. 7

If Black did not answer White 34, I would simply atari at B and then play the forcing move of 35. It would also be possible to play 1 in *Dia. 9*. Black would probably approach at 2. Both White 42 and Black 43 show fighting spirit.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Figure 3 (45-65). The kind of game I like to play

I did not expect Black 45; I felt very lucky to cap at White 46. I expected Black 1 in *Dia. 10*. Even against this move, capping at 2 would be the best and White should keep pressuring Black with 4. But Black 1 and 3 would be far more relaxing than the moves in the game. Indeed, Cho deeply regretted 45.





Figure 3 (45-65)

Black 49 is interesting. It forces White to play the forcing move of 50 which eliminates the various other forcing moves that inhibit the movement of Black's stones on the left side.



Dia. 10

Black 53 is another problematic move. Getting both territory in the upper left corner and sente does not profit Black — it only adds to White's thickness, which influences the entire board. Simply playing at 63 would have been better than invading with Black 53; White has no good move to make the upper corner complete territory. I felt that I was clearly ahead when things settled down with Black 63.

White 64 is too honest a move. It should

have been around A. Black 65 is an erasing move which shows a fine sense.





Figure 4 (66-84)

Figure 4 (66-84). Unrelenting determination

I threatened the black stone in the center with 70 because I felt that the white group in the bottom left was rather thin. Playing 76 at 79 to stop Black's invasion of the left would have been a solid way; Black 76-White A would follow. This would still seem to be good for White.



Dia. 11

Black 81 is an unrelenting move; I didn't expect it. The response with Black 1 in Dia. 11 would be natural, and I thought White 2 would be a satisfactory answer. If Black then played 3, White could counter with 4 and 6,

making miai of 'a' and 'b'; Black would not have a good response.

If White played 82 at B, Black C would be a perfect response. White 82 and 84 showed fighting spirit. They made C and D miai, so this was not bad at all for White. Shortly after this, White made a terrible mistake and his good game was all but ruined.





Figure 5 (85-108)


Figure 5 (85-108). A terrible mistake turns the tide.

Black 85 and 87 help strengthen the black group, but make the white group above firm, so they are not necessarily profitable for Black. If White 86 at 87, Black could play Black 101-White 97-Black A with a good rhythm, so this move is not desirable for White.



Dia. 12

White 90 is horrible. When Black cuts with 91 and 93, the tide suddenly turns against White. White should be patient and play 1 in *Dia. 12* instead. When Black connects with 4, White will cut with 5 and 7 and capture at 9; this would be the way to victory. After White 9, if Black played elsewhere, White could still harass the black group with 'a'.



Dia. 13

Because of my mistake, Black can counter White 98 with 101. My oversight was that I thought I could separate Black's stones with 1 in *Dia. 13*. However, I realized that Black could counter with 2 and 4. After this, if White cut at 'a', Black would play 'b'; if White played 'b', Black would squeeze with 'c'. Whatever White did, it would not be good. Consequently, White has to retreat with 102.

Black 103 is also an astute move. If Black played 104, White B would follow, but I was not confident in this situation, either. Yet Black 103 through 107 do an even better job.

The terrible thing is that the black cut at 99 creates a lot of bad aji for White, causing him continuous irritation. White needs another move to erase this bad aji, so, in retrospect, White has lost about a half move as a result of White 90.

Figure 6 (109-134). Feels like a loss

White 10 is thin. Black 11 and 13 force White to reinforce this thinness with 14. Instead of 10, White should play 1 in *Dia. 14*. When Black makes territory with 2, White can

harass the black group with 3; the game would still be difficult and the result unclear.




Figure 6 (109-134)

4 with 2 to prevent that. Black would then play 2-White 'a'-Black 'b'-White 'c'-Black 'd'-White 'e'-Black 'f', and Black would be ahead.





Figure 7 (135-152)

43,46: take ko; 47: connects four stones




Dia. 14

White 20 is also dubious. This move should have been played at A, followed by Black B and White C. I thought White 20 was sente, but Black gets life with 21 and 25, then switches to 27. When White threatens the black group with 28, Black counters with 29 and 31. White's game is deteriorating.

Figure 7 (135-152). The wrong order of moves

Cho regretted the order of Black 35 and 37. If Black connected with 1 in Dia. 15 first, and if White responded it with 2, Black could capture vital white stones in the center with 3 and 5. Therefore, White would have to connect at



Dia. 15

When White defends with 50, Black 51 is necessary; otherwise, White A would threaten the life of the black group. Cho was probably disheartened by his mistake at Black 35 — he went into the self-destruct mode after White 52.

Figure 8 (153-170). Both are pessimistic.

In response to the marked stone, just linking up around here doesn't seem interesting, so Black feels tempted to play 53 and 55. After 56, I was startled by the sequence from Black

57 to 61. When White cuts with 62 and 64, this capturing race, at first glance, looks good for White.





Figure 8 (153-170)
60: connects




Dia. 16


Instead of Black 57, if Black played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*, Cho thought Black would be behind, but I was not confident. Ishida Yoshio, who was the referee and who is known for his computer-like endgame calculating skills, also thought that Black would be ahead. After White 6, Black would cut with 7, and Black would settle his group with 11. From here the endgame would begin. When we examined it carefully, Cho was right: White would be a little bit ahead. Yet this would be a very tricky endgame, so it would be difficult to predict who would win. Cho probably lost his fight-

ing spirit as a result of his mistake at Black 35 in Figure 7; he also lost his cool and decided to embark on a dubious capturing race. If that is the case, the marked stone was the winning move, for it caused Cho to play rashly.

After the game, Cho suggested Black 1 in *Dia. 17*. But because of 10 and 12, White would still win. You should note that the capturing race in the game is far closer than it looks.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Kato Masao

Figure 9 (171-194). Winning the ko fight

At first, I thought I would win this capturing race unconditionally, but in reality it could not be resolved straightforwardly. Black has a tricky move at 79, so White cannot relax.

If White played 84 at 1 in *Dia. 18*, after the sequence to Black 4, White would lose. After

taking two black stones with 'a', White would have to connect at the marked stone before filling the liberties at 'b' and 'c'.

The game ends up with a ko fight. I was confident of victory when I confirmed some ko threats around 88.

Black resigns after move 194.

(Kido, July 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)




Figure 9 (171–194)
84, 87, 90, 93: takes ko

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Kato Masao

Played on June 7-8, 1995 at the Nankai South Tower Hotel Osaka.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki.

Figure 1 (1–24). Black walks steadily.

The opening starts right off with an interesting move. Black plays 3 on komoku (the 3-4 point) in the opposite corner. With the white stone at 2 also on *komoku*, this position is known as 'fighting komoku'.

Playing White 6 in response to an approach move at 5 is Kato's specialty. Cho plays this move anyway. This is an interesting strategy, isn't it? Playing your opponent's favorite move against him. Maybe I'll try the same strategy myself next time.

Black 7 is currently fashionable. Before that, Black 1 in *Dia. 1* was often played. But this wide extension leaves open a white invasion at 'a', which is annoying. Because of this

invasion, professionals like to extend only two spaces to Black 7.





Figure 1 (1–24)

However, Black 1 in *Dia. 1* also has advantages. White cannot readily play 'b' against it, that is, exchange White 18 for Black 19. This means that Black 'c' becomes a threat to the two white stones in the top left corner, so if White approaches the black stone in the top right with 2, Black could pincer with 3 and aim at 'c'. Moreover, Black 1 makes a better balance with the marked stone in the bottom left corner than Black 7.




Dia. 1


By choosing Black 7, which is regarded as a solid move, Black reveals his intention to play a steady fuseki. This is why Black opts for the steady moves of 9 and 11.



Cho is off to a good start with a win in the first game. Otake Hideo joins the post-mortem discussion.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Because of his steady fuseki strategy, couldn't Black consider playing 1 in Dia. 2 instead of Black 13? In the game, because Black 13 is high on the fourth line, Black 21 is necessary after White 20. In retrospect, I prefer Dia. 3 to the game. It is my opinion that the negative effects which result from inducing Black 19 outweigh the positive effects of preventing Black A with 18.





Figure 2 (24—33)

Figure 2 (24—33). Stubbornness

Black has to defend with 25 after White 24. Without this defense, White could attach at A, and if Black 25, start to squeeze Black with White B, Black C, White D, Black E, White G, followed by White F. As a result, White would easily get a strong position in the center.



Dia. 4

Instead of 25, Black 1 in *Dia. 4* is viable. Even in this case, White would attach at 2 and play the sequence to White 8. These moves expand White's influence at the bottom as well as giving support to the white group on the left side. After 10, White can aim at b after forcing with 'a', so Black must eventually go back and defend this cutting point. White 24 and 26 can be regarded as a set strategy.

Kato chooses to defend at 25. Cho still attaches at White 26. Anyone would want to play here: without White 26, this game is not going to get off the ground. Of course, White is expecting the strongest counter moves with Black 27 and the following.

Now that Black has played 25, he would never play 27 at 3 in *Dia. 4*. If he did, White would immediately take the lead.

After White 28 to 32, Black plays 33 to deny the white group eyes; now the game suddenly reaches a critical stage.


Black 29 is the proper move. Black 1 in *Dia. 5* kills the corner, but it leaves a lot of bad *aji* which White would sooner or later take advantage of. White will aim at the forcing move of 2 or the attachment at 'a'.

White could live in this corner with 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 6*, but this is a very poor way of living. Unless White 3 were at 'a', White could not bear this result. After White 5, Black would attack with 6. It follows that Cho played 30 to try to find a better outcome.


Figure 3 (33-44). Intensive reading

A fierce and unexpected fight has erupted.

I do not like to use my brain in such a place, but the fight has begun, so I have no choice.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6





Figure 3 (33-44)

Cho attached at 34 with the intention of getting eye shape or escaping. Cho is thinking that rather than being forced into a miserable life, then he will sacrifice the corner stones and squeeze to get a thick position on the outside.

If White played 36 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black would respond with 2 to 6; White would not have enough space to live. For example, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', and after Black captures White 'c', White cannot atari with 'd' because he is short of liberties. (Black 4 at 5 would become a ko when White plays at 'd'.) A similar situation would result if White played 1 in *Dia. 8*: White would die. Thus,

White 34 and 36 are the best moves for making life.



Dia. 8

After this, the situation becomes very complex. If White played 38 at 42, Black would play 44, letting White live with A. But this is a very painful life. If White played 40 at A, it would result in a ko fight, but White could not fight this ko.

Pushing through with Black 43 feels good. But Black could instead go after the white corner stones and kill them. In *Dia. 9*, White 2 and 4 start a ko fight, but Black would end this ko with Black 15, a very attractive way of finishing it. Even if White could play 14 and 16, the black group there would not die because Black could still attach at 17.

White 44 is necessary. White 44 at 1 in *Dia.* 10 would lead to Black 2 through 13. Then Black 14 would land the death blow to White. According to Cho, he hadn't seen Black 14 in his analysis.






Figure 4 (45-54)

Figure 4 (45–54). Good for Black


From the last figure to this figure, the attitudes the two players seem to be displaying are intriguing. Cho seems to invite Kato to capture his stones, while Kato declines and seems to prefer taking the two stones on the left side. It is often the case in professional go that when one side offers stones, the other side refuses to capture them. That is what fighting spirit is all about.




Dia. 9



Dia. 10




Dia. 11



Dia. 12

For example, instead of 47, Black could unconditionally capture the white stones with 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 11*, but Black would then have to expect a severe attack on his group above with White 6. It would be severe because of the forcing moves at White 'a' or 'b', and 'c'. However, this is a viable option for Black. Black 47 is also attractive. Its effect on the game appears to be better, if I may say so.

Kato does not capture the corner stones, so Cho escapes. Nonetheless, White 48 is dubious. Cho later reflected that he should have played this move at 1 in *Dia. 12*. In the game, Black 49 is the vital point, which shakes White up a bit. White A is not necessarily a forcing move, so White's group has poor eye shape.



Dia. 13

The fighting which began with the bottom left corner seems to have calmed down with White 48. The result is that Black 47 has made the shape of the white stones bad, so Black has gained some advantage. However, it often happens that when the situation becomes good for a player, he looks for safe and steady moves. This state of mind often stops a player from employing his ability fully. Black 51 is such a move and most likely resulted from Kato's feeling that he was now ahead. Kato later reflected that Black 51 at 1 in *Dia. 13* would have been better, giving him a good move at Black 3 next.

Figure 5 (55-82). The game becomes unfocused.

In Tokyo, some people watching the game argued that the game was over for White. I did

not reach that extreme conclusion, but Black is clearly ahead. The problem is that when you have a good game it is often hard to attain victory. That is the way go is. Having a good position is causing Kato to worry excessively about finding the right path to victory.






Figure 5 (55-82)

I question Black 55. How about 1 in *Dia. 14* instead? If White doesn't respond and plays elsewhere, Black could attach at 'a', so White would have to answer with 2. The question now is: does Black still play at 'b'? If we compare Black 'b' with Black 3, anybody would agree that Black 3 is bigger. Because Black plays 55, Black 57 is necessary; thus, White gets to play at 58, which is so big that Kato must have felt he had been dealt a powerful blow.



Dia. 14

When White played 58, the entire situation became unfocused for Black. Black 59 seems to indicate that Black has become pessimistic about the situation. Black 59 is a risky move. In the first place, it could become a wasted move; that is, it could be captured without any compensation. Second, it helps White to play 62. Third, it erases the possibility of a black attachment at 'a'. As you can see, I can easily come up with many criticisms of this move.



Dia. 15

Black's forcing moves at 65 and 67 aim at attacking the white groups in the lower left corner and on the upper side. That is to say, these moves force the white groups to escape in the same direction and aim to attack them simultaneously. A direct assault such as the one in *Dia. 15* only thickens White towards the center, so it should be avoided. Therefore, Black launches an attack on the weak group on the left, but White gets an eye with 82. Black 82 is also big in terms of territory. White 58, 68, and 70, as well as White 76 and 82, in response to Black's attack, have all benefited White territorially.

Figure 6 (83-101). Optimism causes misfortune.

From the end of the fighting with White 48 until now, Black has played almost no profitable moves, yet White, on the other hand, has made an all-out effort to gain territory in various parts of the board. Black's lead has been substantially reduced, but the fact that Black is leading is still unchanged.

Kato's assessment was that as long as Black could make territory in the center, he would maintain his lead. Black begins to make this territory with 83 and 85. In response to White 90, Black 91, usually a normal move, is in this case a severe move. It not only averts a white invasion in the center, it also gives

Black sente. White cannot play anywhere else but 94, though 94 is not at all a small move.





Figure 6 (83-101)


The assesment that making territory in the center would let Black maintain his lead seems to be correct. Yet, is there any reason for Black to retreat with 97? Black could just as well have expanded his territory with 1 in *Dia. 16*. If White played 2 and 4, Black would keep expanding his territory with 3 and 5. There is no argument about which is better, Black 97 and 99, or Black 1 and 5 in *Dia. 16*. Black would augment his territory by one extra line. The difference is significant.



Dia. 16

Probably because of his optimism, Kato starts playing recklessly. Black should have

played 101 at A, at least. An even better move, as Kato pointed out after the game, is Black 1 in *Dia. 17*, to rob White of his eye and force him to do something. Moving into the center with White 'a' does not seem to get White anywhere. Cho said that White would patiently respond to Black 1 with 2 and aim to make sabaki with 4, 6, and 8. But this seems unbelievable. Black could fight a ko there immediately after Black 3; or playing 3 at 'b' would still lead to a black victory. We will later see that playing Black 1 would erase some of its own bad *aji* around there.



Dia. 17

Figure 7 (102–152). White seizes the lead.

White plays 2 and 4, 6 and 8 (which prevents Black's forcing move at 46), and White 10. Now, Black has no chance to win. White promptly makes forcing moves with 12, 14, and 16, and then plays 18: his victory is now assured. You can also infer how big it would have been for Black to have played 46 from the fact that Black cannot connect with 48 when White plays 44. If Black connected with 48 instead of 45, White would cut with A, Black B, White C, Black D, White E, and then White 47 and F would become miai. White F would breach Black's territory in the center.

Anyway, it is aggravating that Black cannot connect with 48, but has to answer with 45 and 47. White 48 even becomes a sente. Because of all of this, Black probably feels like crying.

In the end, Black's losing move was 9. Black should have first played the forcing

moves of 1 and 3, then played 5 in *Dia. 18*. The exchange of Black 1 and White 2 would have prevented White from reaching as far as 'a', and Black 3 would also profit Black by three points. If White does not answer, Black could live unconditionally in the corner with 'b'. Check this for yourself.





Figure 7 (102–152)



Dia. 18

In retrospect, we can see that settling the shape in the bottom left corner benefited Black enormously. The result made Kato overconfident and he felt that he could play any move and still win. That was the cause of his problems.

Cho, on the other hand, won as a result of his patience, waiting for chances to occur. Rather than trying to catch up with Black

quickly, he took small gains in various places, then sought out new chances. This patient way of playing increases the chances of pulling off an upset more than by taking a gamble and playing an all-or-nothing strategy, hoping to turn the situation around immediately. *White wins by 4 1/2 points.*

(Igo Club, August 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)




Figure 8 (153–232)

112, 118, 124: take ko at 108;
115, 121: take ko at 109;
125: connects below 107;
126: connects at 109; 132: connects at 53

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played on June 27–28, 1995, at Hotel Nagoya Castle in Nagoya

Ten days had elapsed between the third and fourth games. During this time, Kato played three games. Cho played only one game, against O Rissei in the Meijin league. It was an important game and he lost it. As a consequence, Cho no longer had the sole lead in the league.

'I didn't know what to do with Black in the fuseki,' lamented Cho after that game. Cho would have to play as Black again in this game. Was he going to worry about how to play with the black stones in this game, too?

Figure 1 (1–32). The sanren-sei opening

It has been three years since the sanrensei was played in a Honinbo best-of-seven match. Already, Black 13 surprised people in the pressroom, who said that 'It is very hard to come up with such a move.' After the game, Cho argued that 'Black 13 will make Black A a good move later on.' It is Cho's style not to try to compete in the establishment of a moyo.




Figure 1 (1–32)

White 14 was a commonsense move. Cho countered White 14 by expanding his own moyo with 15. Cho then defended the upper side with 17 and 19.

White 20 was a good point. After Black played 21, invading at the 3–3 point with 22 was perfect timing. Cho claimed that Black 17 should have been 20. But then it would have been a different game.

Without responding to White 26, Black approached the black stone in the lower left corner with 27. It was also important to play in the right upper corner; with only Black 25 and White 26 there, the shape is not quite settled. But Black first invaded White's moyo. As a result, the nature of this game — each side erasing the other's moyo — was determined. Kato spent one hour thinking about 28; he seemed to hesitate over what to do. After the game, White 28 at B and White 30 at 31 were discussed to find out which moves were better. In the game, the important point was how strongly White could attack this black group.

Figure 2 (33–62). Cho's win-or-lose move

Black 33 was the sealed move. It gave Black's group on the left shape, but Cho's feeling was different: 'I thought it gave a balanced result, considering the power struggle in this area. But during the night I regretted it.' Cho thought he should have played this move at A. Yet Kato argued, 'That may be true, but Black 33 is a normal move, too.' Kato immediately took the initiative in the upper right corner with White 34, then, with 44, returned to focus on the left side again.





Figure 2 (33–62)

Cho then began to think very hard. Kawashima Hiroyuki, the official reporter who was in the playing room, got the impression that Cho was going to do something dramatic, so he stayed in the room until Cho made his move. After 52 minutes, Cho played Black 49. In the pressroom, an amateur player had suggested this move, but since it would weaken the black group on the left side, everyone rejected it. None of the professionals expected Black 49. When the move was played, they all gasped, 'Well, what can you say, it's Cho Chikun.' Cho himself said, 'I didn't know what to do; I made the move out of desperation.'

To counter Black's overplay, Kato responded with the seemingly strong moves of White 50 and 52. White 52 was problematic, however. White 1 in *Dia. 1* instead would have been better. The moves are almost the same as in the game, but here White 1 is positioned

better than White 52 to attack the black group.

After Black 61, Kato launched an all-out attack the black group with 62. There was no other way because White had lost too much territory on the lower left.



Dia. 1




Figure 3 (63–145)

Figure 3 (63–145). Kato laments his loss.

Seizing as much territory as possible, then scrambling to make his groups live is Cho's specialty. At this point, Cho seemed confident in his chances of living with his groups on the lower left. The only move he was afraid of was White 72 at 77. If Black answered this move by connecting at 72, White 78, filling the liberties of this black group, would have been very severe. If Black did not respond to 77, White would have aimed at White A to take away



Moments after Kato resigns the fourth game. Only one more win to go for Cho.

Black's eye shape there. When White played 72, Cho breathed a sigh of relief, and when White went after the black group above with 74, Cho became confident of victory.

After the game, Kato said he regretted that he didn't play 74 at 77, making an eye for his big group. If he had played at 77, the black territory on the lower left side would have shrunk as well. Because White did not play 77, Black connected there in sente. Black then made an eye with 79 and created some cutting points in White's group with 85 and the following moves. Black then played forcing moves with 99, 101, and 103, and finally played 105, which not only increased his territory, but also linked up and made life for his huge encircled group.

In addition to Black's territorial gains in various places, the white group beginning in the lower left corner did not have eyes yet. White did not want to play 108 and the following moves, but he had to.

Black 119 decided the game. White 138 was the last strong move, but Black 139 through 143 prevented White from gaining big profits. After Black 145, Kato spent seven minutes thinking, then resigned.

'I lost territory, I lost eyes. . . .' Kato lamented.

Black 49 was the move that led to Cho's gaining the advantage and, finally, to an overwhelming victory.

White resigns after Black 145.

(Go Weekly, July 4, 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Kato Masao

Played on June 27-28, 1995, at Seifukan Hotel in Hiroshima

Reported by Hideki Yamamura from the Mainichi Newspaper

Figure 1 (1-31). The fewest moves for the first day's play

In this title match, a different fuseki was played in each game. White 6 and Black 9 are older-style moves, but White 10, grabbing territory in the corner, brings this game back to a modern fuseki.




Figure 1 (1-31)

Up to White 20, each player has allowed the other to do pretty much what he wanted. Black 21 and White 22 are good moves. After 24, Kato and Cho begin to assert their individual styles. Kato takes a very big point at Black 25; Cho, on the other hand, plays 26, aiming to attack the black group on the left. After Black 27, Cho stopped and spent one hour and forty minutes thinking before attaching at 28. By playing this move, Cho hoped to create defects in Black's position.

After Black played 31, White 32 became the sealed move, ending the first day's play. This was the fewest number of moves played on the first day of this entire title match.

Figure 2 (32-82). A seesaw battle

The sealed move was the peep at 32. After this forcing move, White extended to 34 to get ahead territorially. However, Black's cap with 35 was very severe. It leads to the exchange of White 40 for Black 41, which is a loss for White. Kato was quite satisfied to have forced White to play this exchange. After White 42, Black is forced to play 43. Cho later said, 'Black 43 numbed my brain.' White does not have an appropriate response to it, so in retrospect it is clear that 'White 28 and 30 were dubious,' as Cho claimed later. Taking these two white stones is much bigger than it looks.

When he invited the ko with 50, Cho underestimated the danger of this ko fight. While Kato was taking a long time consider-

ing his next move, Cho began to realize the gravity of the problem. If Black fights this ko wisely, the game may turn out to be lost for White. Now it is Kato's turn to think and, just like Cho before playing his move at 28, Kato spent exactly one hour and forty minutes thinking about his move at 53. Instead of immediately fighting the ko, Kato decides to make his shape neat and firm on the bottom with Black 53. This was a good choice and he had clearly put the time spent on thinking about this move to good use. Cho thought it would be bad for White if Black made ko threats around A; such ko threats would not result in any loss for Black.




Figure 2 (32-82)


56, 62: takes ko at 46; 59: takes ko at 51

In response to Black's ko threat at 63, Cho exchanges 64 for 65, then resolves the ko with 66. Nonetheless, Black creates territory on the upper side and takes a clear lead. Even though Black has lost this ko fight, the black group on the left is still alive. During the post mortem analysis, White 69 instead of 66 was discussed, but no favorable results for White were found. Kato's strategy to threaten the ko without fighting it turned out to be successful.

Kato is aware that he is ahead, but he immediately plays a dubious move. He should have played 73 at 80. White now gets to play 80, an all-out move, played with perfect timing.

Kato is being very cautious and defends with 81, but this leaves White with a forcing

move at C. As a result, Cho feels prepared for the fighting that is about to emerge on the bottom and right sides.



Dia. 1

Instead of 81, Black should play 1 and 3 in Dia. 1; this should lead to a winning game. Kato has been forced by Cho's vigor to retreat a step. Cho, sensing his chance, storms into Black's moyo with 82, which conceals a very frightening threat.




Figure 3 (82-138)

Figure 3 (82-138). A time-saving move

It was expected that Black would get a fair amount of territory at the bottom, but after White's invasion, this expectation no longer exists. Kato then made an overplay with 89. If he answered White's invasion mildly with 90

instead of 89 and aimed to attack the two white stones on the right side, Black would still be ahead. Maybe Kato was rocked by the invasion and felt that it was necessary to attack the white group with 89.

When White ataris Black 87 with 90, the black group on the left side suddenly finds itself endangered. With 99, Black is playing in utter desperation.

Now Cho plays White 130 and 132, moves which almost lead to his defeat. This results in Black 135, which robs White of his eyes. As Cho later recalled, 'I thought White had many eyes, then I realized that I was erasing my own eyes. It didn't occur to me that Kato was seriously trying to kill my group.'

After realizing his dangerous situation, Cho played 138 — he was now in *byoyomi* — as a time-saving move so he could continue to think about his next move, but . . .




Figure 4 (139-164)

Figure 4 (139-164). A fantastic record

'I did it again,' Cho later admitted. White 138 was an absent-minded time-saving move of the kind Cho is prone to make. Kato started thinking deeply. In the pressroom, Iwamoto 9-dan was very excited watching this game, saying, 'White is in danger.' Yet, because Black went all out to kill the white group with 139, Cho was able to hold on to victory.

In the pressroom, Black A was discussed. But in the public commentary that evening, an amateur pointed out that if Black played 139 at 144, White A, then Black would cut with B,

punishing White for his mistake at 138. Then Black would be territorially ahead even if White lived.

Both players are using their brains at full power, producing an exciting game, but White 138 and Black 139 seem to have fallen into an air pocket.

Black's efforts to kill the white group ended with the demise of the black group in the left center. It looks like a capturing race, but White has far more liberties. With Kato's resignation, this title match came to an end.

Cho: 'My bad move seems to have caused Kato to make a bad move. I was lucky.'
Black resigns after White 164.

By winning the fifth game, Cho defended his Honinbo title for the sixth consecutive time, equally Sakata's record of holding this title for seven consecutive terms. Counting the two terms he held the title in 1981 and 1982, this makes a total of nine terms that he has held this title.

(Go Weekly, July 4, 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari)

An Interview with Cho

Go Weekly: Congratulations on winning the Honinbo title for seven consecutive terms. Please tell us how you feel about it.

Cho: If I had lost the last game, I don't know what would have happened to me. That's all I was thinking about when I woke up this morning.

GW: Please review this series.

Cho: Considering the quality of play in this match, I feel that I should have won two games and lost three. Kato was unlucky in not being able to take advantage of my mistakes.

GW: Yes, Kato said that from the middle of the game, he fell apart. He felt he was helpless and hopeless. By the way, what was your most memorable move in this series?

Cho: Without doubt it was 138 in the fifth game. I don't know why I played such a terrible move. My brain must have gone crazy.

GW: Your next target is undoubtedly nine consecutive terms or ten, isn't it?

Cho: Well, that kind of record is based on one victory at a time. I just think that I should play wholeheartedly from now on.

Iwamoto Reminisces

on the Atomic-Bomb Game

This fifth game was played on Seto, an island in the Inland Sea located in Hiroshima prefecture, the same prefecture where the first atomic bomb was dropped. Iwamoto Kaoru and Hashimoto Utaro were playing the second game of the match in an outer suburb of Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped 50 years ago. Iwamoto, who is 93 years old and still in good health, was invited as a special guest for this game. During the first day of the game, he visited the site in Itsukaichi city where he and Hashimoto played that now famous game. (Unfortunately, Hashimoto died last year.)

At the request of NHK, the Japanese national television company, Iwamoto talked about what happened on that fateful day for a satellite television program. His memory was still vivid—in fact, it seemed that visiting this place intensified his remembrance of the experience he underwent even more.

Itsukaichi city is located in the countryside near Hiroshima city. The house where the game was played had been rebuilt seven years ago. Iwamoto 9-dan looked at the garden and remarked, 'Oh, the garden has not changed. The pond is still there where it used to be.'

'At 8:15 in the morning, August 6, 1945, the sky in the east lit up, then after a while an extremely powerful wind hit the house. The sliding paper doors were blown down, and the door seemed to be bent by the power of that wind. Hashimoto Honinbo jumped into the garden, and I fell on the board.'

'For the next hour, we cleaned up the mess, then started playing the game again. Around noon, the victims of the bomb started passing by the house. It looked like hell on earth. "Everybody except me has died," I thought.'

In the train on the way back to Tokyo, I asked Iwamoto for some tips on living a long life.

'Don't look back on the past with regret; look forward to enjoying tomorrow.'

In September, his long-time dream of building go centers in Seattle and New York will be completed. He is looking forward to going there and seeing them.

The 8th Fujitsu Cup

Round One: Kobayashi vs. Seo

White: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Black: Seo Bong-soo 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 3 hours each.

Played on April 1, 1995, at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio.




Figure 1 (1-71)

Figure 1 (1-71). Focus on the new Kisei

This year a number of young players are attracting a lot of attention in the Japanese go scene, but first and foremost is Kobayashi Satoru, the new Kisei. Surprisingly, this is the first time he has taken part in the Fujitsu Cup, but his debut was spectacular. He defeated two of Korea's top players, Seo Bong-soo and Cho Hyun-hun, to reach the quarterfinals. His first opponent, Seo Bong-soo, is the current Ing World champion, though he has never had much success in the Fujitsu Cup.

Black 21 and the combination of 37 and 39 are Seo's style. Black intends not only to erase White's moyo before it matures, but also secure his group as quickly as possible.

White A, instead of 40, would be problematic. In response to White A, Black would play 42 and easily settle his group at the top. Since this was Black's aim, White played the forcing move 40 and a hane with 42 as a counter-strategy.

White 40 requires a firm decision because it makes Black's territory on the right side strong. Satoru probably felt that as long as White's stones along the top were linked up, White could be satisfied with this result.

It is hard for Black to decide how to respond to White 58. Black has several options here. For example, if Black plays 66 instead of 59, White plays at 59; if Black plays 60, White cuts with 59. In both cases, White will make sabaki. Consequently, Black 59, 61, and 63 are the strongest response.

Instead of 69, Black could play 70 to capture two white stones. However, with the forcing move at B, White would squeeze Black by playing White C, Black D, White E, Black 69, White F, Black G, and White 71. This would be bad for Black.




Figure 2 (72-136)

Figure 2 (72-136). Black takes the lead.

After the fight in the bottom right, White's moyo on the left has become quite big, so we can say that White has made a good sabaki. Black 77, in answer to White 76, looks unsatisfactory, but since Seo is very good at reading, he must have been able to foresee that he could invade White's moyo even after White 78 and 80.

Satoru regretted playing White 90 and 92. When Black invades deeply with 93 and 95, White does not have a move to trap these

stones. Consequently, White's moves around here have not accomplished anything, and White completely loses his moyo's territorial potential. When Black played 101, Seo took a clear lead. In retrospect, instead of 92, White should have played the vital point of 99, which would have been a thick move. If White had played 99, Black would have played A, and White B would have stopped any further black incursion.

Seo, aware that he was leading, started playing very cautiously. For example, even though White's cut with 136, taking four black stones, was worth 13 points, Seo chose Black 135 in order to make the game easy for him to calculate.

Nonetheless, Satoru later told me that even at this moment he wasn't so pessimistic. Was this because of his excessive confidence or optimism? Whatever it was, it led to an upset in this game.




Figure 3 (137–219)
63: connects at 48

Figure 3 (137–219). A half-point victory

White 40 and 42 are a clever endgame tesuji combination. Instead of 43, if Black played at 45, White would play 43, Black A, and White pushes at 95. The situation could become complicated. To avoid this complication, Black answers safely with 43 and 45, but White's connection with 44 and 46 increases his territory considerably. So instead of 39, Black could play 46 to prevent White's tesuji there; Black 39 at 46 would even let Black

play B to further reduce White's territory.

Even at this point, Black is still ahead, but Seo keeps playing questionable moves one after another. For example, Black 63 is too small at this point. He should play this move at 78 (White connects his two stones), then follow it up with 66; had Black played this way, he would very likely have won.

White's forcing moves of 64 and 66 make Black's lead minute.

Instead of 75, Black still should have forced at 78. This move would eventually force White to defend within his territory. If White had no eye in the center, Black would play C, White D, and Black E. As you can now see, White 78 is bigger than it appears.

Black 107 was a terrible mistake and became the losing move. Before playing 107 and 109, Black should have played a forcing move at 114. Black would then be slightly ahead. When White plays 112 and 114, Black has lost.

This half-point defeat must have been a shock to Seo. He must have felt, 'How can I lose such a game?' Satoru, on the other hand, had shown that Lady Luck was still with him. 219 moves. White wins by 1/2 point.

(Kido, June 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

After this lucky win, Satoru went on to convincingly beat Korea's Cho Hyun-hun, the winner of the 1994 Fujitsu Cup. However, in the quarterfinals he finally fell to Yoo Chang-Hyeok, the 1993 champion.

In the other quarterfinal matches played on June 3, Kobayashi Koichi defeated China's Cao Dayuan, Cho Chikun beat Yu Bin, and Ma Xiaochun beat Rin Kaiho.

With Japan's two top players in the semifinals, Japanese fans expected that at least one of them would prevail in the final. But it was not to be. Cho was the first to be eliminated when Ma beat him by half a point. However, Kobayashi had an easy time stopping Yoo for a 6 1/2 point win.

The showdown was now set: China vs. Japan. Ma Xiaochun is now one of the top players in the world. He holds five titles in China, so he is clearly the number one player there. However, he had not done well in international tournaments until he won the Tong Yang Securities Cup earlier this year.

What is the reason for his recent success? One might be his recent marriage, but Ma denies this. He claims that it is because of a new-found confidence; a confidence bolstered from his success in the the Japan-China Meijin match against Kobayashi.

The Final Round

Kobayashi Koichi vs. Ma Xiaochun

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Ma Xiaochun

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 3 hours each

Played August 5, 1995 in Tokyo




Figure 1 (1-67)

Figure 1 (1-67)

Against Black 11, the descent to White 12 which produces a tense atmosphere. According to Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, White 12 was a natural response. If White played 13, Black 12-White 26-Black 18-White A would follow. Then Black would slide to 49. This would be good for Black. In the sequence in the game, Black 19 is the important move, a move first discovered by Kobayashi. Without this move, if he simply went after the white stones with 21, squeezing at 42 would be severe. This has become a standard pattern.

Takagi Shoichi 9-dan, who was watching in the pressroom, expressed surprise that the sequence to 30 was the same one he had played against Kobayashi in the Honinbo league seven years ago.

Against Black 31, White 32 aims at capturing with 40 and 42 in sente. By capturing, White no longer has a cutting point at B, so everyone watching the game agreed that after 43, White's thickness was better than Black's profit, which is less than 20 points. However, opinion was divided on White 44. Some felt that letting Black live in the corner, cutting off Black 7 from its allies, and getting thickness in the center was good for White. Others, however, felt that White should have played 44 at 48. White 44 is not the kind of move Kobayashi usually makes.

In this sequence, Black 51 is a good move to remember. If Black links up at 56, White will descend to 52 and attack the whole group.

When Black played 67, the game adjourned for lunch. At this point, Ishida Yoshio said that he preferred White's position.




Figure 2 (68-150)

114: captures at 90

Figure 2 (68-150)

White 78 is a good move. White then links up with the moves to 84. Watching Kobayashi make these moves on the TV monitor, one could see that Kobayashi felt the game was going in his favor.

Invading with 85 was natural: no other move would have been appropriate. White 86 was also natural. White 88 was an alluring move, but everyone expected White to play at A. One variation is White A-Black 105-White 90-Black 97-White 113. The left side is big, so White is good. But White played 88. The rea-

son this move was so tempting was that it attacks the black group on the left and it looks for a chance to attack Black's group on the right. Even if Black defends against A by playing 89, White has forcing moves at 106 and 108 and he can expect to get a strong attack on the black group. According to Ishida Yoshio, White is not bad, but when Black plays 135, the threat of a ko at B makes White's position fragile.





Figure 3 (151-213)

Figure 3 (151-213)

Black made two eyes with 79, so we expected that the game would now be decided in the endgame, but unexpectedly a fight erupted.



Dia.1

Because Ma was under an illusion, he played 93. This illusion caused him to believe that after 94 to 98, he could atari at 99, then play A and save his stones. If White connects at 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black saves his stones in the sequence to 22 if White tries to capture him in a loose ladder. This is why White defended at 100. Therefore, Black 93 was a wasted move.

Figure 4 (214-294).

White's advantage is now quite evident, but an unbelievable thing happened: White played 114. Black then took the ko with 115 and after 123, White must fight a ko to rescue his stones. However, he doesn't have enough ko threats, so the dead black group of three stones that includes 93 comes back to life while capturing four white stones. Instead of 114, if he had simply played the steady move at 120, Kobayashi would have been won the game.

White wins by 7 1/2 points.

(Go Weekly, August 29, 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)




Figure 4 (214-294)
ko (over 115): 124, 127, 130;
132: connects (at 115);
185: connects (left of 149)

Go Proverbs That Are Always True

by Furuyama Kazunari

1. Don't Play Close to Thickness!


There are many go proverbs. Some are always true, but for most of them counter-examples are abundant. One of the proverbs that you will never find an exception to is: 'Don't play close to thickness!'

Before you can apply this proverb in your games, however, you must understand what thickness is.


While I was studying at a university in Portland, I had many go students. One day I was reviewing a game played by one my students, and when I commented on one of her moves I told her, 'Don't play close to thickness!'

A few days later, she came back and showed me a problem in a book and said that she didn't understand why the answer it gave was correct. She said, 'The move recommended for White looks too close to Black's thickness.'

The problem is shown in *Dia. 1*. The caption read: 'Where should White play, A, B, C, or D?'



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

The book recommended that White play C or D. But when White plays D, Black will attack with 2 in *Dia. 2*, forcing White to make a two-space extension close to the seemingly 'thick' black corner enclosure.


I immediately understood her problem: she could not distinguish between positions which were thick and those which were not.

In order to clarify the difference, I showed her a similar position, the one in *Dia. 3*.



Dia. 3

In this position, the shape of Black's two marked stones, lined up together, is called *tetchu* in Japanese, which means 'iron pillar'. These two stones are strong and immovable, much like an iron pillar anchored deep into the ground. In combination with the two other black stones on the right, this makes for a thick position.




Dia. 4

In this case, White 1 in *Dia. 4* is a bad move because, when Black plays 2, he drives White into his thickness on the right side.

As I explained to her, the black stones on the right are thick. After White 3, Black has various ways to attack these white stones,


such as at 4. Black's iron pillar is so thick that White has no way to attack this position. Any move he makes around here will be like bashing his head against a telephone pole. In other words, White has no *sabaki tesuji* or light move against the black stones through which he could strengthen his own two stones.

In *Dia. 2*, however, White will have no trouble making *sabaki*. For example, if Black attacks with 1 in *Dia. 5*, White can jump to 2. White now has many ways to make *sabaki*: he can play at A, B, or C.




Dia. 5

Diagram 6 shows one *sabaki* sequence in which White can make good shape. White can get another eye by playing at A. Whether White plays this sequence or B or C in *Dia. 5* depends on how the game develops.



Dia. 6

It is more likely that Black will attack the white stones by jumping to 1 in *Dia. 7* instead 1 in *Dia. 5*. White would respond by jumping to 2. White can now make *sabaki* by attaching at A, jumping to B, or playing the knight's move at C.




Dia. 7

Because a corner enclosure is not as thick as the 'iron pillar' in *Dia. 3*, Black's attack at 2 in *Dia. 2* is less threatening.

To summarize, Black's corner enclosure in *Dia. 2* is strong, but it is not thick enough to overwhelm the white stones like the 'iron pillar' in *Dia. 4*. Against the iron pillar, White doesn't have any *sabaki tesuji* as in *Dias. 5* to 7 to help his two stones when Black attacks them with 4 in *Dia. 4*. Hence, we might define a thick position as one which does not allow a weak group to make *sabaki*.

Black 2 and 4 in *Dia. 4* are strong moves because they drive White's weak stones against the powerful thickness on the right. At the same time 2 and 4 start to make a large framework of territory on the left. This is the proper way to use thickness.

Well, where should White play in *Dia. 3*? The answer is White 1 in *Dia. 8*. Whichever direction Black attacks, White can make a two-space extension to A or B.



Dia. 8

To further help you understand the meaning of the proverb under discussion, here are three principles you should keep in mind:

Principle 1. Don't play close to your opponent's thickness; don't play close to your own thickness.

Principle 2. Drive your opponent's stones towards his thickness, forcing them to become overconcentrated.


Principle 3. Attack your opponent's weak stones by driving them towards your own thickness.

These three principles will be made clear in the following examples.

The first example comes from a game between two kyu players. After Black made thickness in the upper right in *Figure 1*, White

and we must conclude that Black has not put his thickness to good use.

White, on the other hand, gets his own thickness on the left side and his stone at 13 also helps to neutralize the influence of Black's thickness.



Dia. 13

If Black plays 8 and 10 in *Dia. 13* to avoid the extreme overconcentration in *Dia. 12*, White will connect with 11. Black is still overconcentrated and White's thickness again acts to neutralize the influence of Black's thickness on the right. White's thickness also affects the black stone in the lower left corner.





Figure 2

In the position in *Figure 2*, White has established a thick position on the upper right side. It is White's turn and he makes an approach move with 1. Is this a good move in


relation to White's thickness above? If you think that it is a bad move, where should White play instead?

White 1 is a bad move because it is too close to the thickness above. In order to understand this, look at *Dia. 14*.

Black attaches with 1, then cuts with 3. After White 10, Black squeezes from the outside with 11 and 13, sacrificing two stones in the process. White gets another thick position on the right side, but these two positions are too close to each other: the white stones are overconcentrated. White's stones are not being used to their maximum efficiency; their influence is overlapping, concentrated on a small territory.



Dia. 14




Dia. 15

Dia. 15 shows another variation. Again, White gets thickness in the wrong place for another terrible result.

Both *Dia. 14* and *Dia. 15* show Black exploiting White's mistake at 1 in *Figure 2* by pushing this stone towards White's own thickness, an application of Principle 2. There are a lot of other counterstrategies White might try, but no matter; the result will be more or less similar to *Dias. 14* and *15*. In other words, if you violate this universal principle of not playing near thickness, whether near your own thickness or your opponent's, you cannot help but get a bad result.

White's thickness in *Dia. 16* dominates the whole board, and its influence is especially strong in the direction of the black stone on the star point in the lower right corner. When White plays at A, it is the same as playing

close to his own thickness. In this case, White should apply Principle 3 and force Black to play in the direction of this thickness.



Dia. 16

Thinking in this way might lead you to play White 1. Black's first instinct would be to answer at A, but this is playing in the direction of White's thickness, so it may be more prudent for Black to jump down to 2. (Without a white move in this area, Black would want to play somewhere around White 1.)

It is hard to assert absolutely that Black 2 is the best move, but it shows how you must think when faced with thickness: you must come up with moves that do not violate the proverb 'Don't approach thickness!'

The last example, *Figure 3*, is from a two-stone handicap game played by amateur dan players. It might be hard for you to find the right move because all the stones are far from the black thickness in the lower left.

Black's thickness in the lower left is acting most strongly up along the left side. (The two marked stones are of no value to White. If White A, Black captures with B.) Now that you know where the thickness is, you will at least know where not to play.

The black player, not really understanding thickness, played 1 in *Dia. 17*. White immediately attached with 2, and the sequence to Black 9 followed. The result was that Black made thickness with his stones at 3, 5, 7, and 9, resulting in two thick positions facing each other and an overconcentration of his stones.





Figure 3

After the game, the black player told me that he thought the best way to make use of this thickness was to make territory on the left side. This was a serious misconception.




Dia. 17

The best way for Black to utilize his thickness is to make an approach move with 1 in *Dia. 18*. If White plays safe and secures the corner with 2 and 4, Black switches to the top right and makes a tight pincer with 5. The sequence to Black 11 would follow.

You might think that Black's two stones at 1 and 3 are weak, but you must remember that Black has forcing moves at A and B to strengthen them. Therefore, these two stones are really stronger than they look, so after 11, Black should not be afraid of a white invasion

at the top. In fact, Black would welcome such an invasion because White still has a weak group in the upper right. If fighting breaks out, Black will try to make the most of this thickness and drive an invading white stone towards it. It would not be easy for White to make eyes in the face of this thickness. If White did invade at the top, he would most likely end up with two weak groups — ideal for Black, disastrous for White.



Dia. 18


In this kind of situation, one way to determine where to play is to attack the opponent's stone closest to your thickness. In this case, it is the lone white stone in the upper left corner. Simply approaching with 1 in *Dia. 18* is a good start. That way a situation may occur in which you can apply Principles 2 and 3.

It is important to keep in mind that the influence the black thickness in *Figure 3* radiates towards the upper side is considerable. If White does not respond properly, Black will punish White by forcing his stones towards his thickness in accordance with Principle 3, where they will not be able to easily make eyes.

For example, if White pincers with 2 in *Dia. 19*, the sequence to White 6 could result. Black would then start a fight by invading at 7, separating the marked stone from the one at 2, leaving White with two weak groups.

The white group in the upper left corner could also become involved in this fight and Black would try to gouge out its eyes by


playing at A. This white group would then have to escape towards the black thickness, violating Principle 1. With his thickness in place, Black can only gain from a fight.



Dia. 19

It is better for White to avoid a fight when Black approaches with 1 and secure the corner with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 18*.

Usually, White 2 and 4 in *Dia. 18* are not good moves because when Black plays 1 in *Dia. 20*, he gets the ideal shape of a three-space extension from the two marked stones. But in this case, the position will become overconcentrated.



Dia. 20

If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 20*, White will attach at 2 and play the sequence to 6. The influence of the two marked stones and of Black's stones at 1 and 5 is now overlapping; hence, these stones are overconcentrated.

To make the most of the overall thickness in the left and upper side, I recommend the tight pincer of Black 5 in *Dia. 18*. If White chooses the conventional joseki from White 6, after Black 11, Black has successfully avoided playing any move at the top which would cause him to become overconcentrated.

Because of the influence of the black thickness on the left side towards the left upper corner, Black A and B are forcing moves. Moreover, the influence this thickness is radiating towards the top gives strong

support to Black 1 and 3. These stones are much stronger than they look.

Recognizing thickness is not easy. It is a matter of practice, study, and experience. As your experience increases, you will gradually develop intuition which will make you aware of thickness. Using thickness is difficult. The knowledge will come from studying many examples in your own games and in books.

But as long as you keep in mind the universal principle, 'Don't play close to thickness,' you will be able to do reasonably well in most situations with the techniques learned here.

For an even deeper understanding of thickness, don't miss the next issue's instalment where we will study the related proverb 'Don't use thickness to make territory!'

New Moves and New Josekis

1. How to Think About Josekis

by Furuyama Kazunari

This is the first instalment of a new series on new moves and new josekis. The explanation is geared to weaker players, but being a topical issue, strong players will also benefit. I will be the writer of this series, but future instalments will draw heavily on comments made by professional players. In this first installment, we are going to study a joseki played in the second game of the Japan-China Tengen match. That game is presented from page 35, immediately following this article.





Figure 1 (1-19)

Figure 1 (1-19)


Instead of Black 19, answering White 18 with A has been considered a joseki for a very

long time. However, many professionals feel that it is better to leave the situation as it is and look for a chance to pincer these two white stones at B. Even if White gets to play 1 in *Dia. 1* before Black can pincer, Black would not be unhappy because White 18 and 34 are not working at maximum efficiency.

To understand this, look at another sequence of moves. Suppose White has a stone on the 3-3 point in *Dia. 2*. Black plays 1 and White extends to 2. Now if Black plays a shoulder hit at 3, White would answer at 4. Clearly, playing 4 at A would be overly submissive and this move is not as efficient as the one at 4. But that is exactly the result in *Dia. 1*.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Even though you will not often see professionals play Black A in response to White 18, this does not mean that this move has been discarded or is not worthy of consideration. You have to remember that professionals are always trying to eke out

minute advantages in every position. Sometimes the reasons for their moves are too subtle for amateurs to understand. But when top professionals, especially title holders, say it is better not to answer White 1 with Black 2 in *Dia. 3* and let White extend to 3, the difference is so small that we should leave the matter to them to find the truth. It will take them several years or even decades of play to confirm their theories.




Figure 2 (19-33)

Black 19 is a difficult move to access. As it turned out, Black got a very good result up to 25, so perhaps White's moves were not as strong as they might have been. Perhaps Black played 19 to induce White to move out with 1 to 8 in *Dia. 4*. That way he would get profit on the left side, but White would get magnificent thickness and influence. We will have to see the results of Black 19 in other games before we can evaluate it.





Figure 2 (19-33)

White 26 is an instructive move. In evaluating it, it is essential to keep the black thickness on the lower left in mind. For White

to play a pincer against the marked black stone at either 1 or A in *Dia. 5* would be a bad idea. Black would jump to 2, separating the pinching stone from the two white ones at the top. Even if White erases Black's potential territory on the left, White has to take care of his stone at 1. It will take White a long time to secure it stone, and this will cause him to lose the initiative and even his potential territory at the top. Moreover, this pincer is also too close to Black's thickness below, and there are many other adverse effects. Remember the proverb, 'Don't play close to thickness!'



Dia. 5

Therefore, White plays 26 through 32 in the figure, making his own thickness. The struggle will now be for Black to make this thickness worthless, while White will try to make the most out of it.





Figure 3 (33-45)

Figure 3 (33–45)


Black refrains from defending against White 32 on the left side and plays the long-awaited pincer at 33.

In an actual game, the situation is changing constantly and you must adapt your moves and the choice of joseki to fit the game position. What may be a good choice of joseki in the early stages of the game could be a game-losing choice later on.

In this game, for example, White has made great thickness on the left. He would now like to construct a territorial framework (*moyo*) at the top to make the most of his thickness. Therefore, White would be most grateful if Black were to play the joseki starting with 1 in *Dia. 6*. In response, White would extend to 2, and a white *moyo* would begin to take shape at the top.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

You should note the high position of White 2. By playing high like this, White is trying to take maximum advantage of the high position of his thickness on the left. Extending on the third line with 1 in *Dia. 7* allows Black to flatten White's position with 2 and 4, thereby decreasing the value of White's thickness on the left. White is no longer able to establish a big, box-like *moyo* at the top.

To foil White's *moyo* strategy, Black quickly enters the top with 33 and 35 to neutralize White's thickness. However, this does not mean that White's thickness will be wasted. In the sequence up to 44, he gets the territory in the upper right corner to offset his loss of territory at the top.

The 'joseki' played here may look strange to those who have studied josekis, but the lesson here is that a joseki should be selected that is appropriate to the position. If no joseki is applicable, that's when new moves are created.

About the author

Furuyama Kazunari was an *insei* (professional go apprentice) for three years at the Nihon Ki-in, but he decided not to become a professional and retired from the Ki-in in order to go to university and pursue a career in the field of international relations. He came to the U.S. five years ago to study international affairs at Lewis and Clark College. During this time, he placed second in the Asahi Best Ten Amateur tournament held in Tokyo. He has also taught many Americans go. He intends to be in the US for a few more years while he attends graduate school, and he hopes to be able to contribute to an improvement in the strength of kyu-level players in America and to help them attain a greater appreciation of go. To this end, he will be writing and translating articles for *Go World* and perhaps also write some books for Kiseido Publishing Company. He hopes that by popularizing go he will be contributing to a greater understanding of the East by Westerners and will be bringing the two great cultures of the East and West closer together.

The 8th Japan–China Tengen Match

The annual Japan–China Tengen match was played between Ma Xiaochun and Ryu Shikun on May 13 and 15, 1995 in Beijing. It is a best-of-three match and Ma won the first two games. Last year, Ma also won this match two games in a row. Since the match was inaugurated, the Japanese and the Chinese have each won it four times.

Ma is China's number one player. Besides the Tengen title he holds four other titles, so Ma's schedule is very crowded. In April, he played two games with Nie Weiping for the Tong Yang Securities Cup in Seoul. He then went back to China to defend his Tengen title. His opponent was again Nie Weiping. Ma defended it with a score of 3–1. The last game was played on April 28, so only two weeks had elapsed since Ma defended his title.

There was a banquet the day before the first game. During the party, the players gave the following speeches.

Ma: 'For the first time I will face a player younger than I. Mr. Ryu is only 23 now. I myself played in the Japan-China Meijin match at 24. Because this match is different from previous ones, I feel that I can't afford to lose. But I also think that I have an advantage because I am older; I have more experience. Anyway, I will do my best.'

Ryu: 'Mr. Ma was already a top player when I became a professional. It is an honor to play a world-class player like him. Rather than worrying about the result, I will just try to play a good game.'

In the first game, Ryu's opening strategy did not work out well and Ma was in the lead from the 115th move on. Ryu went into *byo-yomi* about then, while Ma still had almost an hour. Ma made an important decision to give up a large group, but he got enough compensation for it and won the game.

Game Two

White: Ryu Shikun

Black: Ma Xiaochun

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 3 hours each.

Played on May 15, 1995, Shanghai, China.

Commentary by Yamashiro Hiroshi.




Figure 1 (1–45)

Figure 1 (1–45)

It is rare that Black jumps out with 19 at such an early stage.

Instead of 24, White could attach at A, but Black would not answer it; instead, he would play another approach move against the star point with B. Black would not like that.

Before Black connects with 45, White could play C instead of 36. After the game, Ma said, 'When I played 45, I thought I could not lose this game.' Yet, according to Yamashiro, White's territory in the upper right corner is also big, so White is not behind.




Figure 2 (46–100)

Figure 2 (46–100)

Yamashiro questioned White 46. It provokes Black 49, making the white group on the left thin. It also provokes Black 63 and 65. These two moves exploit White's bad *aji* in the upper right corner. Instead of White 46, it would have been better for White to approach from the other side by playing at 47. Black would answer with 46, White 62, Black 82, followed by White 69 to eliminate the bad *aji* in the upper right corner.

Black's sacrifice from 69 and the following moves is impressive; this strategy is proof of Ma's awesome power. Nonetheless, Black could have played 1 in *Dia. 1* instead of 79. Black would win the capturing race that follows by one move.

Instead of 6, if White played 1 in *Dia. 2*, this would result in a *hanami-ko*. When White plays 98, the game is very close.




Figure 3 (100–268)

Black 11 is a bad move. If Black connected with 22 in response to White's peep, White would play 19, and thus 95 or 24 would be miai for White. To avoid this, Ma comes up with Black 13 and 15 and gets to play 19, but these are makeshift moves. When White ataris Black 13, it is obviously a loss for Black.

At this point Ryu went into byo-yomi. He must have felt rushed because White 20 and 30 were game-losing moves, according to Yamashiro. After playing the forcing moves of

22 and 24, White should play 59. Black 31 was the winning move. Even though Black's lead is minute, his victory is certain.




Figure 3 (101–178)




Figure 4 (179–268)

107: takes ko (right of 90); 110 takes ko (at 90);
137, 143, 149, 155: takes ko (right of 90); 140,
146, 152: takes ko (at 90); 158: connects at 153;
159: connects (at 90); 163: takes ko (left of 146);
167: connects (at 46); 168: connects (at 113)

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(From Go Weekly. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

A New Publication on Go and Business

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by Yasuyuki Miura

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Mr. Miura also draws on his personal experience in Japan, Iran, and the United States, as an executive for Japan Airlines, to

show how useful go strategy is for making business decisions, and how he used these strategic ideas as president of Nikko Hotels International to map out a strategy for establishing a chain of six hotels in North America.

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
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An Introduction to Tesuji (iii)


Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

This series for novice players covers all the basic tesujis that you are likely to encounter in your games in easy-to-understand positions. This third instalment is about tesujis for winning capturing races. First, try solving the three problems given below. Answers and other examples are given starting on page 52.




Problem 1

Each side has four liberties. Where should Black play?



Problem 2

Black has only three liberties, but White seems to have a lot more. Where should Black play?




Problem 3

Black has only two liberties. Still, Black can win the capturing race. Where should he play?


Important Stones and Useless Stones

by Takagi Shoichi


Here is a problem for you to think about. White's four stones on the lower right side have yet to make shape. It is Black's turn to play. The first moves that occur to you may be to cut at A or B. But then the clamp at C also looks interesting. Besides these three possibilities, Black may have other strong moves. The answer and analyses start on the next page.



Problem Diagram




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

5: connects



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 1. Small gains versus big gains

Cutting at 1 is not very good. White plays 2 and 4, sacrificing two stones, then jumps to 6, invading Black's sphere of influence above. Black has only managed to capture some useless stones, so White has achieved strategic success. Next, if Black cuts through with 'a', White 'b', and Black 'c', Black will play 'd'. If White 'a' and 'e', Black 'f'.

Dia. 2. Sacrificing useless stones

After Dia. 1, if Black cuts with 1, White ataris with 2 and 4. After Black connects with 5, White lets Black take two more stones with 7 and 9, but again he scores a great strategic success when he plays 10; Black has only captured two more useless stones.

Dia. 3. An attacking attitude

What about the cut at 1? If White plays 2 and 4, Black attacks White by peeping at 5 and jumping to 7. White's stones are heavy and must escape into the center to live.

Dia. 4. Making sabaki


However, White will not play so simply as in Dia. 3. Instead, he will attach at 2 and crosscut with 4. If Black 5, White ataris with 6 and breaks out into the center with 8 and 10. Black will suffer a big loss either above or below.

Dia. 5. The same tesuji


Instead of 5 in Dia. 4, Black could also play 1 in this diagram. However, after Black 7, White plays the same tesuji with 8 and 10. Black finds himself in a double attack.

Dia. 6. A strong attack

Next, there is the clamp at Black 1. If White connects at 2, Black 3 and 5 leave White with a heavy shape. If White escapes into the center with 'a', Black plays a tesuji at 'b'. However, White will not allow Black to play such severe moves.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 7. Counterattack


In answer to Black 1, White will counter with 2 and 4. (If Black 'a' in answer to 2, White will atari at 'b'.) After Black 5 —

Dia. 8. White gets sabaki

White ataris at 1, then connects at 3. (Black can't fight the ko.) Up to 7, White has made *sabaki* and has subdued the strategically important marked stone.




Dia. 7



Dia. 8


Dia. 9. The same position

White can cut at the top with 2 and the position reverts to Dia. 8 after White plays 1.



Dia. 9

What is the problem? All the seemingly reasonable attacks against White's four stones in Dia. 1 fail. The problem is that White's four stones there are useless stones and it is a general principle that you should never attack useless stones directly. Doing so will just give them new vibrancy and allow them to make *sabaki*.



Dia. 10

Dia. 10. The correct way

The correct way is for Black to play 1, making thickness with an 'iron pillar'. This move indirectly attacks the white stones while solidifying Black's territory at the top. After White 4, Black can consider attacking with the cap of 5. Whatever the outcome of this attack, Black can get additional profit with the sequence 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c'.

(Igo Club, March 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)


An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Fighting Capturing Races

In a capturing race the side with the most liberties will win. However, which liberties you fill can sometimes be important. There are also ways in which you can decrease your opponent's liberties and ways in which you can increase your own.

Problem 1. Fill the outside liberties first!


When two groups are engaged in a capturing race, you should start filling liberties from the outside, not from the inside where the struggling stones have liberties in common. If you start filling inside liberties first, you may discover that you have reduced the number of your own liberties.



Dia. 1

Dia 1. A bad move


Black 1 is an example of filling an inside liberty. By making this move, Black has lost a liberty and it is White who now wins the capturing race up to 4.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. The correct move


Filling an outside liberty with Black 1 is correct. Black 1 at 'a' or 'b' would also be correct.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black wins


White plays 1, but Black is one move ahead; he puts three white stones into atari with 4.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Example 1

In this example, the point 'a' is an inside liberty. If Black plays on this point, he will lose the capturing race.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5. From the outside

Black easily wins the capturing race by filling the outside liberties with 1 to 5. White cannot prevent Black from playing 'a', capturing his three stones.

Dia. 6. Example 2


In this example, White has four liberties to Black's three. What should Black do?



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. The tesuji


The hane of Black 1 is the tesuji. If White prevents the link-up, he will find himself short of liberties. For example —



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. Black wins

If White blocks at 1, Black ataris at 2. If White takes at 'a', Black ataris again at 'b' and White cannot avoid being captured.




Dia. 9

Dia. 9. Failure


If Black plays an ordinary move like 1, White will win the capturing race. After White 4, Black can't stop White from capturing at 'a'.

Problem 2. Decreasing your opponent's liberties

Many kinds of positions arise in games and it might seem like your opponent is far ahead in liberties, but if you play the right tesuji, you will find that you are the one who is ahead.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 1. Black loses


If Black plays ordinary moves such as 1 to 5, it becomes clear that he loses the capturing race when White plays 6.

Dia. 2. The tesuji

Black has to sacrifice a stone with 1, then squeeze with 3. Next—



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Black wins

After Black plays the marked stone, White has to connect with 1; it is clear that Black wins the capturing race when he plays 2.

Dia. 4. Example 1


Black's position seems to be in tatters. He would like to rescue his three stone in the center, but White seems to have the edge in the capturing race. Can you see the tesuji?

Dia. 5. The cut


After Black cuts at 1, the atari at 'a' seems to secure White's stones, but —

Dia. 6. The tesuji


When White ataris at 1, Black 2 is a tesuji. White captures at 3 and Black draws back to 4. Next —




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 7. Black wins


White starts to fill Black's liberties with 1, but Black ataris with 2, and the fight is over. Even if White exchanged 'a' for 'b' before playing 1, it would make no difference in the outcome.

Dia. 8. Black loses

Black 1 allows White to connect at 2. White is now one move ahead in the capturing race, so Black loses.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 9. Example 2


White's three stones in the corner seem well entrenched, so you might think Black will lose the capturing race there. However, Black has a tesuji to prevent White from increasing his liberties.

Dia. 10. Correct Answer

Black attaches at 1. If White connects at 2, Black links up at 3 and Black is one move ahead in the capturing race.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 11. Variation


If White blocks the link-up with 2, Black still wins the capturing race up to 5.

Dia. 12. Only one stone

If Black captures a stone with 1 and 3, White plays 2 and 4 and he ends up with four liberties to Black's three.

Problem 3. Increasing your own liberties

If you are unable to decrease your opponent's liberties, there might be moves which allow you to increase your own, or at least prevent White from playing on your liberties.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1 Black loses

Black 1 cannot be the correct move because White ataris Black's three stones with 2.

Dia. 2. The tesuji


Black 1 is the tesuji. With this stone in place, White cannot play at 'a' because he is short of liberties.

Dia. 3. Black wins


White must play 1, after which Black plays 2. Before White can play at 'b', he must capture at 'a', but Black is threatening to capture two stones with 'c' first.

Dia. 4. An example

If Black adds a stone to his embattled group, he can increase their liberties.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 5. Making an eye


In a capturing race, if your embattled group has an eye and your opponent's doesn't, you will have the advantage. In this case, making an eye with 1 is the correct move.

Dia. 6. Black wins

White starts to fill the outside liberties with 1, but after Black 2, White cannot atari at 'a' because he is short of liberties.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 7. Black loses

Black can also make an eye at 1, but in this case, it is a bad move because Black is filling an inside liberty. White ataris at 2 and after he captures with 3, Black finds himself in atari when White plays 4.



Dia. 7

Black 1 at 'a' also loses; White again wins by playing 2 and 4.

(Let's Go, March 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)

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The 22nd Wangwi Title Match

Game Seven

Yoo Chang-hyeok vs. Cho Hyun-hun

The Wangwi is the most prestigious title in Korea. Unlike most of the other Korean titles, it is decided by a best-of-seven match. Although only a 6-dan, Yoo has held this title since he won it from Lee Chang-ho back in 1991. By defeating Cho 4-3 he has won it for four consecutive terms. Having lost all of his titles, winning this match would have retrieved some of Cho's pride and former glory. However, it was not to be. Cho lost the last game in a hard struggle that lasted 345 moves.

Therefore, White 20 is a natural and strong move. Black has to make *sabaki* from 21 to 32. But White gets sure profit; this was too big.

White could have played 48 at 51, but by playing 48, White again gains sure profit.

Black plays an all-out move with 61 in an attempt to turn the game in his favor. However, Black should have played 69 at A so as to expand his influence. This was not consistent with his previous moves.

Black 79 should have been played at 82, changing his strategy for real profit.

Instead of connecting at 90, White should have played B or C, after exchanging 96 for 97, in order to reduce Black's central influence.

Game Seven

White: Yoo Chang-hyeok Wangwi

Black: Cho Hyun-hun 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points.

Played on July 6, 1995 at the Korean Ki-in.




Figure 1 (1-100)
28: connects at 21

Figure 1 (1-100)

Black tried a new move with 19. The usual move is to defend at 20 or 29.




Figure 2 (100-200)

9: takes ko (at 3); 34: takes ko (at 6);
37, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 66, 71,
74, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99: takes ko

Figure 2 (100-200)

Black pursues White with 19, taking the territory in the center.

Figure 3 (201–345)

White 28 was the move that sealed the victory for White. Because of this move, the corner becomes a seki.

White wins by 3 1/2 points.

(NHK Igo Kōza, September, 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)




Figure 3 (201–345)

5: takes ko (below 2); 8: takes ko (at 2);

11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26: takes ko;

67: connects (at 64); 92: captures two stones (at

4); 94: connects (at 35); 97: takes ko (below 2);

99: connects (at 50); 110: connects (at 103);

115: takes ko (at 29); 118: takes ko (at 112);

121, 124, 127, 130, 133, 136, 139, 142: takes ko;

144: connects (at 29); 145: connects (at 2)

The First FOST Cup World Open Computer Go Championship

As of August 20, eleven programmers have applied to enter the First FOST Cup. It seems that there will be about 16 participants in this event.

The programmers who have applied so far are as follows:

1. Ken Chen USA
Go Intellect
2. David Fotland USA
Many Faces of Go
3. Gary Boos USA
Teamgo
4. Michael Reiss UK
Go++
5. Martin Mueller Switzerland
Explorer
6. Yan Shi-Jinn Taiwan
Timmy
7. Chen Zhixing China
Handtalk
8. Kwak Min-ho Korea
ORTHOUGHT
9. Yasuo Oishi Japan
GORO
10. Takeshiro Yoshikawa Japan
Dai Honinbo
11. Takenao Yoshida Japan
Muzuki

The favorites in this championship are Ken Chen, David Fotland, and Chen Zhixing. These are the programs that have done well in previous computer tournaments. Go Intellect was the champion in last year's international computer go championship sponsored by the Ing Foundation, while Handtalk was the 1993 champion. Many Faces of Go has consistently placed second over the last few years.

The dark horse of this championship may be Yoshikawa's Dai Honinbo. Mr. Yoshikawa claims to have developed a new theory of go scoring, and this could be his secret weapon in defeating the other competitors.

Two other strong programs have yet to be entered. They are Mark Boon's Goliath, and Bruce Wilcox's Ego. If these two programs participate, all the world's strongest programs will be represented.

A full report on this tournament will appear in the next issue.

Who Is the World's Strongest Player?

by John Power

The World's Top Ten

1. Cho Hun-hyun (Korea): 61
2. Takemiya Masaki (Japan): 40
3. Rin Kaiho (Japan): 36
4. Nie Weiping (China): 29
5. Cho Chikun (Japan),
Lee Chang-ho (Korea): 28
7. Otake Hideo (Japan),
Ma Xiaochun (China): 23
9. Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea): 22
10. Seo Bong-soo (Korea): 20

The points above are based on results in international tournaments (as of September 1995).

In the absence of an international rating system for go like the chess one, there is no clear and convincing way of ranking the world's top players. There's no problem choosing the members of the top group: just take the top players from Japan, China, and Korea over the last decade. These players select themselves — see below.

Japan

Cho Chikun, Kobayashi Koichi, Kato Masao, Takemiya Masaki, Rin Kaiho, Otake Hideo, Kobayashi Satoru.

China

Nie Weiping, Ma Xiaochun, Cao Dayuan, Yu Bin, Liu Xiaoguang, Qian Yuping.

Korea

Cho Hun-hyun, Seo Bong-soo, Lee Chang-ho, Yoo Chang-hyuk.

The problems start when one tries to rank the above players relative to each other. Unlike chess, international tournaments are not the mainstream in go. Some of these players have played each other one hundred times or more in domestic tournaments, but very few players from different countries will

have played each other as many as ten times.

Even so, the only objective basis for a ranking system would be the international tournaments. We would like to propose a ranking system based on points for the top four places in these tournaments. Tentatively, we would like to propose the following points table.

Ing Cup

1st: 15; 2nd: 8; 3rd: 5

The Ing Cup is the premier international tournament and is held only once every four years, so it is given most points.

Fujitsu Cup, Tong Yang Securities Cup

1st: 10; 2nd: 6; 3rd: 3; 4th (Fujitsu): 2

These two tournaments can be rated as the same points value, though the Fujitsu Cup prize is worth a lot more. Note, however, that the Tong Yang Securities Cup did not become a full-scale international tournament until its third year; in the first two years there was only token foreign representation, so for these two years it's not counted.

Jinro Cup: SBS World Championship

Not counted, as it is a team event. However, it's worth considering how the Jinro results could be factored in. (One player may win four or five games in a row, leaving it up to his team captain to win the final and deciding game. How does one compare these two performances?)

TV Igo Asia Championship

1st: 5; 2nd: 3

This tournament is not given full points, as it is restricted to a small field (winners and 2nd-place getters of TV tournaments in Japan, China, and Korea).

IBM Cup

Held in Japan for three terms, but not counted, as there was only token foreign representation.

Japan-China Super Go, Japan-China Meijin & Tengen playoffs

Not counted, as participation is restricted and the first is a team event.

Applying this system gives a list of the world's top ten that most people would endorse — with one striking exception. Kobayashi Koichi has been the dominant player in Japanese go in the last decade, but he doesn't make the list. Actually, his recent second place in the 8th Fujitsu Cup puts him in 11th place with 13 points. One reason why Kobayashi doesn't do well in international go is that he gives top priority to domestic Japanese tournaments. He has never played in the Tong Yang Securities Cup and he also missed the 2nd Ing Cup. However, he has had his fair share of success on the international scene, winning five out of seven Japan-China Meijin playoffs. Chinese players consider him their nemesis: he has won 31 out of 39 games against them.

The top-ten list reflects Korea's recent domination of international events. Cho Hun-hyun has a commanding lead, which is not surprising, considering that he is the only player to win all three of the main international tournaments, the Ing, Fujitsu and Tong Yang Cups. (He also beat the Japanese and Chinese number ones to win the 3rd Jinro Cup for Korea.) His consistently good results in international tournaments (including a good record against Kobayashi Koichi) make his claim to be the world's number one hard to dispute. It's ironic that his dominance in international go comes at a time when his disciple Lee Chang-ho has almost completely shut him out of the domestic title scene in Korea.

Four Japanese representatives make the list, but two of them have also played for other countries. Rin Kaiho and Cho Chikun appear as Japanese representatives in various international events, but Rin is entered as a Chinese Taipei player in the Ing Cup and Korea claims Cho Chikun in events it organizes.

The reader may disagree with our points system and the way we apply it. To enable you to make up your own list, we present below all the data on which ours is based.

However, we predict that no matter how you fiddle with the points system, the top-ten order won't change much.

International Tournaments

The Ing Cup: The World Professional Go Championship

(Invitational knock-out tournament, best-of-three semifinals, best-of-five final, held once every four years; organized by the Ing Chang-Ki Foundation in Taipei.)

1st Ing Cup (1989)

1st: Cho Hun-hyun (won 3-2)
2nd: Nie Weiping
3rd: Fujisawa Shuko, Rin Kaiho

2nd Ing Cup (1993)

1st: Seo Bong-soo (won 3-2)
2nd: Otake Hideo
3rd: Rui Naiwei, Cho Chikun

The Fujitsu Cup: The World Go Championship

(Knockout tournament, organized by the Nihon Ki-in.)

1 (1988). 1st: Takemiya Masaki; 2nd: Rin Kaiho; 3rd: Nei Weiping; 4th: Kobayashi Koichi.

2 (1989). 1st: Takemiya; 2nd: Rin; 3rd: Cho Hun-hyun; 4th: Seo Bong-seo.

3 (1990). 1st: Rin Kaiho; 2nd: Nie Weiping; 3rd: Kobayashi Koichi; 4th: Cho Hun-hyun.

4 (1991). 1st: Cho Chikun; 2nd: Qian Yuping (China); 3rd: O Rissei (playing for Japan); 4th: Kobayashi Koichi.

5 (1992). 1st: Otake Hideo; 2nd: O Rissei (playing for Japan); 3rd: Ma Xiaochun; 4th: Liu Xiaoguang.

6 (1993). 1st: Yoo Chang-hyuk; 2nd: Cho Hun-hyun; 3rd: Kato Masao (Japan); 4th: Awaji Shuzo (Japan).

7 (1994). 1st: Cho Hun-hyun; 2nd: Yoo; 3rd: Rin Kaiho; 4th: Cho Chikun.

8 (1995). 1st: Ma Xiaochun; 2nd: Kobayashi Koichi; 3rd: Yoo; 4th: Cho Chikun.

The Tong Yang Securities Cup: The World Go Championship

(Knock-out tournament, best-of-three semifinals, best-of-five final; upgraded to a world championship in 1992; organized by the Korean Ki-in.)

1 (1990). 1st: Yang Jaeho (Korea); 2nd: Jang Soo-young (Korea); 3rd: Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea), Kim Hi-jung (Korea).

2 (1991). 1st: Seo Bong-soo (Korea); 2nd: Lee Chang-ho; 3rd: Cho Hun-hyun, Kim Hi-jung.

3 (1992). 1st: Lee Chang-ho (Korea); 2nd: Rin Kaiho (Ch. Taipei); 3rd: Cho Hun-hyun, Cho Chikun (Korea).

4 (1993). 1st: Lee Chang-ho (Korea); 2nd: Cho Chikun (Korea); 3rd: Nie Weiping, Cho Hun-hyun.

5 (1994). 1st: Cho Hun-hyun; 2nd: Yoda Norimoto (Japan); 3rd: Nie Weiping, Yoo Chang-hyuk.

6 (1995). 1st: Ma Xiaochun (China); 2nd: Nie Weiping (China); 3rd: Cho Hun-hyun (Korea), Yamashiro Hiroshi (Japan).

TV Igo Asia Championship

(Knockout tournament for winners and second-place getters in Japan's NHK Cup, China's CCTV Cup, and Korea's KBS Cup. The previous year's winner is also seeded.)

1 (1989). 1st: Takemiya (Japan); 2nd: Kobayashi Satoru (Japan).

2 (1990). 1st: Takemiya; 2nd: Lee Chang-ho (Korea).

3 (1991). 1st: Takemiya; 2nd: Cao Dayuan (China).

4 (1992). 1st: Takemiya; 2nd: Cho Hun-hyun (Korea).

5 (1993). 1st: Yoda Norimoto (Japan); 2nd: Seo Bong-soo (Korea).

6 (1994). 1st: Otake Hideo (Japan); 2nd: Qian Yuping (China).

7 (1995). 1st: Lee Chang-ho; 2nd: Cho Hun-hyun.

Jinro Cup: SBS World Championship

(Team knockout tournament with five-player teams from Japan, China, and Korea. Each player keeps playing until he loses, his opponents alternating between the other two

countries. Sponsor Korea. The winning country and outstanding performers are given.)

1 (1992–93): Korea (Cao Dayuan of China three wins).

2 (1993–94): Korea (Seo four wins, Yoda five wins).

3 (1994–95): Korea (Miyazawa of Japan four wins, Lee Chang-ho four wins).

IBM Haya-go Open Tournament

(One hour per player + 30 seconds byo-yomi. Participation open to Japanese amateurs, but none got past the preliminaries. Two players each from Korea and China took part each year. We can't find a record of a playoff for 3rd place in the first year.)

1 (1988). 1st: Ishida Yoshio (Japan); 2nd: Takemiya Masaki; 3rd: O Rissei, Oyama Kunio.

2 (1989). 1st: Otake Hideo; 2nd: Ishida Yoshio; 3rd: Hikosaka Naoto; 4th: Yoda Norimoto.

3rd (1990). 1st: Kobayashi Satoru (Japan); 2nd: Ohira Shuzo (Japan); 3rd: O Rissei; 4th: Ishida Yoshio.

China Adopts Points Rating System

The innovation that Westerners would perhaps most like to see in go is the adoption of an international points system covering all players, professional and amateur, in all countries. There is little interest in this in Japan at present, but back in the 1980's Sakai Takeshi led an effort to implement a points ranking system for professional players; unfortunately, it met with so much opposition that it was abandoned.

The Chinese seem to be less hidebound. A recent issue of *Go Weekly* (1 August 1995) reports that they have adopted a points system and that it is already in full swing. However, it seems to be in use just for professional players.

The way the system works is for each player to be assigned a points score based on his rank. For example, 9-dan is 2560 points,

8-dan is 2520, and so on, with each professional rank being worth 40 points. Nie Weiping and Ma Xiaochun were treated separately, each being given 2600 points (making them the equivalent of 10-dan, which doesn't exist as a professional rank).

A player's points change with each game he plays. If the players have the same points, the winner goes up five points and the loser goes down five. If their ratings are different, the points gained and lost are adjusted, for example, 6-4, 7-3, and so on.

After half a year, Ma has the top rating of 2656. The only other rating given in the *Go Weekly* report is that of the 18-year-old new star Chang Hao 7-dan. Starting, as a 6-dan, at 2440, Chang is now 2541.

The Chinese are able to include international games in their rating system by the

simple expedient of assigning points to players from other countries. Top Nihon Ki-in players such as Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Koichi have been assigned the same initial score as Nie and Ma, 2600. Ryu Shikun, holder of the Tengen title but still a 6-dan, is counted as an 8-dan.

The drawback for the Chinese is that the ratings of foreign players don't change. Since Ma's rating has gone up so much, he would score only four points for beating Cho or Kobayashi but lose six points if he lost. A 1-1 result against the pair of them would see his rating drop by two points.

The first two years of the new system are a trial period during which imperfections can be remedied. If the Chinese system proves a success, we hope the Japanese will be inspired to follow suit.

The Top Dogs of Japanese Go

This article updates and expands the section in The Go Player's Almanac entitled 'Go Records'. It is mainly based on an article by Kawakuma Hiroyuki in the 1995 Kido yearbook (actually called Igo Nenkan), updated to the end of June 1995. (JP)



Sakata's record safe for a few years yet

1. Most titles won

(Big three titles — Kisei, Meijin, and Honinbo — are given in parentheses)

1. Sakata Eio: 64 (9)
2. Otake Hideo: 43 (4)
3. Cho Chikun: 42 (18)
4. Kobayashi Koichi: 41 (16)
5. Kato Masao: 37 (4)
6. Rin Kaiho: 34 (13)
7. Ishida Yoshio (6), Fujisawa Shuko (8): 23
9. Takemiya Masaki: 19 (6)
10. Takagawa Kaku: 18 (10)

Apart from increases in the tallies for players from no. 2 to no. 6, the main change is that Kobayashi has gone ahead of Kato. Cho should overtake Otake before long, but Sakata's record looks safe for another decade; actually, it would be a very daunting task for the players following him to maintain top form long enough to overtake him.

Cho Chikun has been the most successful in top-three titles. Not only does he have the highest tally, 18, but also they account for nearly half of his total. His closest competitor here is Kobayashi Koichi, followed by

Rin Kaiho and Takagawa Kaku.

The new Kisei, Kobayashi Satoru, has won seven titles, including one international one, the 3rd IBM Cup.

2. Lifetime wins (as of March 1995)

1. Sakata: 1103 wins, 613 losses, 16 *jigo*
2. Rin: 1014–570–2
3. Kato: 959–464–2
4. Otake Hideo 910–536–2 + 1 no result
5. Kobayashi Koichi: 867–405–1
6. Cho Chikun: 859–400–3 + 1 no result
7. Fujisawa Shuko: 825–623–10
8. Takemiya: 773–427–4
9. Kudo Norio: 716–415–4
10. Ishida Yoshio: 714–396.

3. Best winning percentages (players who have played 1,000 games plus)

1. Cho Chikun: 68.22%
2. Kobayashi Koichi: 68.16%
3. Kato: 67.4%
4. Takemiya: 64.4%
5. Ishida Yoshio: 64.3%

4. Most successive title wins

1. Takagawa: 9 (Honinbo)
2. Kobayashi Koichi: 8 (Kisei)
Kato: 8 (Oza)
4. Sakata Eio: 7 (Honinbo)
Sakata: 7 (Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship)
Kobayashi Koichi: 7 (Meijin)
Cho Chikun: 7 (Honinbo)
8. Fujisawa Shuko: 6 (Kisei)
Otake: 6 (Gosei)
Kobayashi Koichi: 6 (Gosei)
11. Cho Chikun: 5 (Meijin)
Ishida Yoshio: 5 (Honinbo)
Rin Kaiho: 5 (Tengen)

Kobayashi missed his chance to challenge Takagawa when he lost the Kisei title to Cho last year, but he has a second string to his bow in the Meijin title. If he falters, Cho is coming up fast in the Honinbo title. All the above players have earned honorary titles.

5. Most appearances in title matches (restricted to the current seven open titles)

1. Kato: 48 (28 wins, 20 losses)
2. Rin Kaiho: 44 (21–23)
3. Kobayashi: 43 (28–15)

4. Cho: 38 (25–13)
5. Otake: 36 (17–19)
6. Sakata: 35 (21–14)

6. Most appearances in best-of-sevens

1. Rin: 29 (13–16)
2. Kobayashi: 22 (16–6)
3. Cho: 21 (17–4)
4. Sakata: 17 (9–8)
5. Fujisawa Shuko: 15 (8–7)
Otake: 15 (4–11)
7. Takagawa: 14 (10–4)
8. Kato: 13 (5–8)

Cho has never lost a challenge for a best-of-seven. Rin and Otake have lost more best-of-sevens than they've won, but just playing in a top title match is a tremendous achievement regardless of the result.

7. Most wins in haya-go (quick go) tournaments

- 16: Sakata, Otake
12: Cho
9: Rin
8: Ishida, Kato
6: Takemiya, Kobayashi Koichi

8. Oldest title-holder

Fujisawa Shuko: 67 (1992 Oza title)

9. Most successive appearances in best-of-sevens

Kobayashi Koichi: 11

Kobayashi played in every best-of-seven from the Meijin title match in 1989 to the Kisei title match in 1993. In 1992, each match went the full distance, so he played 21 best-of-seven games in one year, another record. In the same year, he appeared in six of the seven open title matches, setting a record of playing 34 titles games in one year (he defended the Kisei, Meijin, and Gosei, and lost challenges for the Judan, Honinbo, and Oza).

Second is Cho Chikun, who played in six successive best-of-sevens from the 1982 Honinbo to the 1984 Kisei.

10. Most successive title match appearances in one title

Rin Kaiho: 10 (Rin played in every Meijin

title match from 1965 to 1974 (4th to 13th Yomiuri Meijin). He won seven of them.

11. Most appearances in leagues (title match defences are included)

1. Rin Kaiho: 61 (Meijin 32, Honinbo 29)

2. Sakata: 53 (Meijin 19, Honinbo 34)

(Note that the figures given in the *Almanac* did not include title match defences, but these are usually included in this statistic.)

12. Most successive appearances in a league

Rin Kaiho: 32 and still going (Meijin league)

(Rin also holds the record for the Honinbo league of 24.)

13. Players who have played each other the most (including a correction)

The item 'Most games between two players (Japan)' in the *Almanac* (page 159) was misleading (to put it charitably). Honinbo Genjo and Nakano Chitoku did play 77 games with each other, but this is not a record even for the Edo period. Honinbo Shuwa played 136 games with Ota Yuzo and 133 games with Yasui Sanchi up to 1853 (publication of Shuwa's complete games was suspended after volume six, which goes up to 1853, so complete statistics are not available).

No modern players can match Shuwa's records, but some are within shooting distance. To start with, the most famous rivals of the 20th century were probably Go Seigen and Kitani, who played each other 83 times. (In *Go World* 26 I mistakenly gave the number as 77 — I missed six in my count. T. Mark Hall kindly pointed out the discrepancy in the *British Go Journal*, issue 91. He found 82 in a Korean edition of the complete games. To set my record straight, the Japanese Heibonsha edition gives 83 games.)

The proliferation of titles in recent decades has enabled a number of players to surpass Go and Kitani. For many years the record was held by Sakata and Takagawa, who met in 98 games, but they have been passed by Rin Kaiho and Kato Masao, who have played 102 games (52–50 in Rin's favour). Close behind them are Kobayashi Koichi and Cho Chikun, who have played

each other 94 times (winning exactly half each) (45 of the games have been in best-of-sevens, of which Cho has won five out of seven). A little further back are Cho and Otake, with a total of 91 encounters (47 to 43 in Cho's favour, with one no-result).

To summarize:

1. Rin v. Kato: 102

2. Sakata v. Takagawa: 98

3. Cho v. Kobayashi: 94

4. Cho v. Otake: 91

These statistics were provided by the Nihon Ki-in, which has been engaged in a project for several years now to computerize its records. The Ki-in's database now covers the last 30 years, including about 30,000 game records. Unfortunately, accessing the information is time-consuming, and by the time we had got the above information we felt we'd taken enough of the programmer's time. The pairs above represent our *guess* as to the most likely candidates — we haven't eliminated other possible pairs.

Most of the other records listed in the *Almanac* still stand. It would be nice to see someone with a knowledge of Korean and Chinese list the records for those countries. In particular, the Japanese statistics pale in comparison with those for Korea, where a much smaller top group (just two players, Cho Hun-hyun and Seo Bong-soo, in the 80s, and now four players in the 90s, with the addition of Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk) compete for a large number of titles. Already in the mid-80s, Cho and Seo had played 165 games in 41 title matches (the most 'recent', if that's the word, statistics I have). The numbers must be astronomical by now.

Ranking the Top Players

It always has to be pointed out when giving lists of tournament records that the rankings are unfair to players who were active in the middle of this century and earlier, as there were very few titles in those days. The first Honinbo title match was held in 1941 and until 1950 it was held once every

two years. Of the current titles, the second to be started was the Oza, which kicked off in 1953. That means that great players like Go Seigen, Kitani Minoru, and Iwamoto Kaoru don't make the lists.

Another problem is that simple tallies of titles won don't distinguish between important and insignificant titles. One win in a big-three title is worth any number of wins in minor titles. Both Kobayashi Satoru and Yoda Norimoto made their real debuts as title-holders this year with their successes in the Kisei and Judan titles respectively. However, Yoda had already won 11 minor titles and Kobayashi five.

There is one simple way of evaluating the importance of a tournament: the number of games played in the title match. If one gives the same points score to a win in that title, then a list of players' tallies might give a better idea of which players have enjoyed the greatest success. Thus, a player would get seven points for each victory in a best-of-seven (regardless of how many games were actually played in each title match), five points for each win in a best-of-five, and so on. A win in a knockout TV tournament is thus worth one point. (One point that has to be watched is that a number of titles have changed the number of games in the title match during their history. In 1945, the then best-of-six Honinbo title match ended in a 3-all draw, then a best-of-three was played the following year. According to our system, Iwamoto scores nine points for his victory.)

The advantage of this system is that one can incorporate the *jubango* that were so popular in the middle of the century, enabling Go Seigen to take a place in the lists. The following list incorporates all the results given in the tournament-records section of the *Igo Nenkan*. There were a large number of tournaments played earlier this century that are not given in the *Nenkan*, but it would take too much research to make a complete list of these.

In theory, this system could be extended back into the Edo period, so Shusaku would get 30 points for his victory over Ota Yuzo in their 30-game match. However, one would hesitate to award Honinbo Doetsu 60 points for his victory in a 60-game match with

Yasui Sanchi in the late 17th century, so, at least in this first version of the list, we'll stick to the last half century.

The Top Ten

1. Sakata: 234 points.
2. Cho Chikun: 195
3. Kobayashi Koichi: 189
4. Kato Masao: 155
5. Rin Kaiho: 153
6. Otake Hideo: 135
7. Go Seigen: 108
8. Fujisawa Shuko: 103
9. Takagawa Kaku: 96
10. Ishida Yoshio: 90

Takemiya is in 11th place, with 65 points. There is then a bit of a gap before the next players. Just for the record, the list continues as follows:

Hashimoto Uтарo: 44
Ohira Shuzo: 27
Yoda Norimoto: 26
Fujisawa Hosai: 21
Kitani Minoru: 18
Shimamura Toshihiro: 17
Iwamoto Kaoru, Kataoka Satoshi: 16
Hashimoto Shoji: 15
Kobayashi Satoru: 12

Notes. The Nihon Saikyo tournament, a 10-game, six-player league, is counted as six points. The best-of-four Saikoi title is counted as five points when a tie made a fifth game necessary. The Japan Series, a league for the current title holders held twice, in 1973 and 1976, has been counted as three. A *jubango* between Hashimoto Uтарo (winner) and Fujisawa Hosai and a six-game match between Sakata (winner) and Go Seigen not listed in the Yearbook have been included. The drawn *jubango* between Kitani and Go Seigen in the 1930s has been counted at 5 points each. Osaka and Nagoya regional titles have not been included.

The cut-off point for all statistics in the above articles is 31 August 1995, except where otherwise noted (most recent title included: the 7th TV Igo Asia Ch'ship).

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